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Introduction
Human rights are a perplexing subject—they are invoked in response to the most extreme
crimes and injustices we confront, and also invigorating the old questions concerning the human
being, what is it? I’m reminded of a story told by Diogenes Laertius: Plato, to much acclaim, had
defined man: a biped without feathers. Diogenes of Sinope plucked a chicken and threw it before
before a crowd. “Behold Plato’s man!” Thanks to Diogenes the definition was revised: man is a
featherless biped with flat and broad nails.1
In theory and in practice human rights, as well as politics, assume a definition of the
human. Diogenes demonstrates that such definitions fail to encompass all humans, fail even to
satisfactorily distinguish the human from other animals. Of course this doesn’t mean that there
aren’t plenty of definitions of the human, but that, taken on their own merit, such definitions
have little value. Yet when applied to questions of politics and human rights these definitions are
of extreme consequence. They are made the basis for some of the most difficult and important
political decisions—responding to the most urgent and sensitive events in the world, situations of
life and death and graver, the definition of the human becomes decisive. A given resolution to the
questions of human rights entails deciding how far the category of human extends and how
humans are to be treated. There isn’t an inedible resolution to this question, but there are many
wrong, and very wrong, solutions, with significant and calculable repercussions.
Engaging with the question of human rights, Jacques Rancière hurls a plucked chicken
into the fray of competing theories and definitions. He pokes holes in arguments and successfully

1

Laertius, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R D Hicks. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1970), 41.
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confronts some of human rights’ most prominent theorists, demonstrating the real and dangerous
implications of a wrong or insufficient theory of human rights.
For this reason I spend my first chapter with Rancière, understanding his argument
against theories of human rights, and establishing what he thinks human rights are. A central part
of Rancière’s take on the question of human rights is that it cannot be thought separately from
politics, or, for that matter, government. This move could be considered reductive, uniting these
three categories, but I believe Rancière achieves a concentration rather than a reduction. As
separate categories it is possible to think rights without politics, or government without rights
(there are six combinations). The reductive move is treating these categories separately, for
rights, politics, and government necessarily include each other. Much of Rancière’s critique of
human rights focuses on exclusive thinking of this nature, which leads to a theory of human
rights that is at best impotent, and at worst dangerous.
I primarily focus on Rancière rejection of Hannah Arendt’s conception of human rights.
This leads me to Rancière’s own conception of human rights. I establish a number of his
concepts, and trace the way he brings together the questions of rights, politics, and, to a lesser
extent, government.
The second chapter takes Rancière’s critique of Arendt seriously and attempts to situate it
in, among other texts, The Origins of Totalitarianism. Here I take scope of the broader
implications of his critique, but ultimately elaborate an interpretation of human rights in Arendt’s
work that escapes the grip of Rancière’s arguments. This interpretation attempts to bring Arendt’s
discussion of rights and politics together by rethinking her ideas of rightlessness and the right to
have rights.

!3
The third chapter extends the thinking begun in the second chapter, moving further into
Arendt’s account of human rights and establishing its relation to the challenges of what she calls
the modern world. I move away from Rancière in doing this, but he remains the background,
coloring my approach to Arendt. I spend a significant amount of time in this chapter with the
original conclusion to Origins, “Concluding Remarks,” and with a speech Arendt gave honoring
Karl Jaspers at his reception of the Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels in 1958. I
demonstrate how ideas of belonging and of humanity influence Arendt’s account of human
rights, and how the idea of human rights derived from these ideas is not incompatible with the
interpretation made in chapter two. I also connect human rights to what Arendt diagnoses as the
collapse of authority in the modern world, and show how the problem of authority is a political
problem around which the question of politics and rights coalesce.
There are no more chapters after chapter three.
Rancière’s critique of Arendt and the disagreement it announces between his and her
writing is the subject of a number of papers which adjudicate the relative merits of Rancière’s or
Arendt’s side in the disagreement. In Arendt scholarship the argument ordinarily comes up as a
point to move past and dismiss, often via footnote.2 Andrew Schaap dedicates an essay to the
critique, ultimately vindicating Rancière. Diverging slightly, I’m of the opinion that Rancière is
good for Arendt, and she, likewise, for him. Each are a valuable counter to the other, and I don’t
find discrediting one on the basis of the other entirely plausible. But as this project is ultimately
concerned, despite appearances, with a relevant understanding human rights, I would say that

2 Alistair
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human rights were never closer than when I approached by way of Arendt and Rancière. The
intent and the method.
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Chapter I
In the essay, Who is The Subject of The Rights of Man?, Jacques Rancière makes a broad
critique of Hannah Arendt’s vision of politics. Grounded in an analysis of “The Perplexities of
the Rights of Man,”3 in which Arendt writes directly on the question of human rights, Rancière
argues that Arendt depoliticizes human rights, and this depoliticization is no accident, but the
result of glaring failures in her conception of the political. Rancière distinguishes two
interconnected problems in Arendt’s work: the theorization of a “state of exception” that places
human beings “beyond oppression”, and to the same degree, beyond politics; and an implicit
endorsement and enforcement of what he terms consensus (one of the looming concepts in his
work), a depoliticizing process which ultimately leads to an erasure of the political. Elucidating
these problems, Rancière returns to the question of the political subject (a question synonymous
with that of the subject of the rights of man, an identification we will return to later in the
chapter) and its relation to politics in order to construct an alternate vision of rights and politics
that avoids the pitfalls of Arendt’s account—setting “the question of what politics is on a
different footing”4. Thus Rancière develops his critique of Arendt into a new theory of politics.
Politics, for Rancière, is a fleeting thing that has neither a “‘proper’ place nor does it possess any
‘natural’ subject”; it is “always on the shore of its own disappearance.”5 In his account, politics is
in equal parts radical and fragile, a disruptive force—interrupting established rule and order—
perennially threatened with eradication. Arendt’s account of rights and politics contributes to this
eradication; Rancière’s ultimate aim is to preserve the possibility of politics from eradication and
3

The second half of the “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man”, the final chapter of the
“Imperialism” section of The Origins of Totalitarianism
4 Jacques Rancière. "Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?" The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 2 (2004): 302
5 Jacques Rancière. Davide Panagia, and Rachel Bowlby. "Ten Theses on Politics." Theory & Event 5, no. 3 (2001):
11
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disappearance. The fact that he engages with Arendt is particularly intriguing because, in a
different manner and from a different tradition, she is also aware that politics is threatened and is
engaged in a project to preserve politics from this threat.

!
The Lack and Withdrawal of Politics
It is already “certainly true”, Rancière writes in 2003, “that we are in a time of a lack of
politics, of a certain withdrawal of politics”6. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade
of the twentieth century was supposed to signify the global success of democracy and the market
economy and usher in a new age of peace and prosperity. Instead this period saw the rise of
numerous ethno-nationalisms, acts of genocide, and the expansion, by democratic states, of
sovereign power to unprecedented limits.7 Rancière’s lack and withdrawal of politics describes
this background, but also rejects “current and widespread propositions regarding ‘the return of
the political’”8, put forth by political thinkers like Pierre Manent. The declared return reasserts a
division between social and political spaces, and anticipates, in the ‘return of the political,’ a
‘pure’ politics in which political space is no longer ‘contaminated’ by social space.9 Withdrawal
also alludes to the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, who propose le
retrait du politique, taking up a “position of retreat [retrait]” regarding politics.10 For them, this
retreat is a necessary position to take in a time when political debate is reduced to almost nothing
and despair or weariness characterize politics above all. But the retreat is neither a rejection nor

6

Jacques Rancière, "Comment and Responses,” Theory & Event 6, no. 4 (2003): 9
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10 Philip Lacoue-Labarthe, et al. Retreating the Political. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 101.
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an abandonment of political questions, it is the establishment of room or space, to “replay [the
political’s] questions anew”, to safeguard the possibility of meaningful intervention in the
questions of the political.11 Rancière’s withdrawal of politics, playing off this retreat of the
political, has the double significance of diagnosing the diminishment of politics in modern times
and also of creating the position from which politics can be approached and theorized anew
Rancière describes two contemporary theories of politics that, following Arendt, lead to
the lack of politics, ultimately contributing to its eradication and disappearance. In Homo Sacer,
Giorgio Agamben takes up a basic distinction between two modes of human life that Arendt
draws from the Greek words zoe or bare life and bios or bios politikos, political life.12 Agamben
uses this distinction of to conceptualize a state of exception, rooted in zoe, and develop a general
theory of politics on the basis of this state of exception. Politics is characterized by this theory as
the power of sovereign states over the ‘bare life’ of its subjects—a direct relationship which is
the hidden root of modern democracy’s relationship to human rights. Following Foucault,
Agamben correlates state power with biopower “a positive power of control over biological life,”
as opposed to the negative, “old sovereign power of Life and Death over the subjects.”13 He then
equates biopower with Carl Schmidt’s conception of “the state of exception as the principle of
political authority.” The mark of sovereignty is thus the power to decide in situations beyond
ordinary politics and legality.14 Thus the power over zoe, over apolitical bare life—biopower—is
the sovereign power of states. Because human rights are meant to apply to bare life, life outside

11

Lacoue-Labarthe, “Retreating,” 101.
This distinction is established in Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press,
1998), 97
13 Rancière, "Who Is the Subject,” 300.
14 Rancière, "Who Is the Subject,” 300.
12
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the realm of the political (Agamben takes this directly from Arendt), and because modern
democracy is supposed to receive its legitimacy from its adherence to human rights, it appears
that the sovereign power of democracy is power over the bare life of its subjects, the state of
exception. The subject becomes an apolitical subject, construed by the state in terms of its bare
life. This compresses the relationship between the subject and democracy into a direct relation of
sovereign power over the bare life, and as a result the state sanctioned mass murders and
genocides of the twentieth century appear as the “secret of democracy”, the Holocaust as “the
hidden truth of the Rights of Man”15. Agamben, following directly on Arendt’s theory around the
distinction of zoe and bios, as well as her conceptualization of a state of exception in the figure
of the refugee, dissolves politics into a direct relationship of state power over bare life, and
simultaneously makes, “any difference [grow] faint between democracy and totalitarianism.”16
The radical crimes attributed to totalitarianism now appear as inevitable results of the
relationship between sovereign power and human rights—that human rights hide the secret of
bare human life, and sovereign power, the power over bare human life, hides behind the rhetoric
of human rights.
The second theorist, Jean-François Lyotard, develops a theory of the rights of others,
which follows Arendt’s idea that human rights belong to the rightless subject, “those who suffer
inhuman repressions [and] are unable to enact the Human Rights that are their last recourse.”17 In
this situation human rights, the paradoxical right of the rightless, become the rights of others,
because someone else must take up their rights in order for the rights to be of of use and to

15

Rancière, "Who Is the Subject,” 301.
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protect those who suffer inhuman repressions. This establishes a right to humanitarian
interference.18 Human rights, according to Lyotard, are useless to the subject of human rights,
and must be taken up by powerful state actors as the rights of others, imparting a responsibility
onto these power states. Human rights become “the rights of the absolute victim”, the rightless,
and “the absolute victim is the victim of an absolute evil”19. It follows that human rights, as the
rights of others, become an ethical responsibility to protect and defend an absolute victim.
Enthralled by this responsibility to the victim, both the demands of justice and the crime visited
up the victim are rendered absolute, “substituting for the process of a political wrong a sort of
ontological destiny.” This ontological destiny pits the the absolute ethical responsibility of the
state actor to achieve justice for the victim against what is now an absolute crime in accordance
with the absolute victim—erasing the legitimacy of any political considerations.
In both analyses the specificity of Rancière’s approach to the political begins to emerge.
Politics does not name the practice of sovereign power—the power of sovereign states is
necessarily oppressive for it reduces individuals into apolitical subject. By defining them as such,
the political capacity capacity for disagreement over what things are, the givens and definitions
of a society, is withheld from individuals. Additionally, rights are not understood as mandates or
entitlements such that they may becomes the rights of others who enforce them. Rights and
politics are deeply entwined because both are activities enacted by the individual with regard to
his own status. When rights becomes a mandate for the activity of others on behalf of the subject
of rights, this actually forecloses the political space, in which rights are nothing else than the
subject of rights’ mandate to politics.
18
19
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Rancière’s Critique of Arendt
In his essay, Rancière begins with the claim that Arendt, in her treatment of the Rights of
Man, revived a critique first made by Edmund Burke, “that the ‘man’ of the Rights of Man was a
mere abstraction because the only real rights were the rights of citizens,” but she made the
revision that, where for Burke these rights were “an ideal fantasy of revolutionary dreamers”, for
Arendt they are “the paradoxical rights of the private, poor, unpoliticized individual”20, that is,
the paradox of apolitical rights. Arendt found this paradox demonstrated in the emergence of
refugees between World War I and II, an event which made the Rights of Man a “a practical
political issue” for the first time.21 In the millions of refugees who appeared on the world stage
following World War I, Arendt found, “the ‘body’ fitting the abstractness of the rights”, an
abstract human, detached from any particular social or national identity. She found the paradox
that, as Rancière paraphrases, “the Rights of Man are the rights of those who are only human
beings, who have no more property left than the property of being human”, making them the
rights of those who have no rights, “the mere derision of right”22. This formulation depends upon
several assumptions, the most important being a conception of the political as dependent upon an
opposition of definite spheres, a clear distinction separating what is political from what is merely
private or necessary. Thus the political sphere is a distinct realm, which excludes the realm of
necessity. This distinction, between a realm of politics and a realm of necessity coincides with
several other distinctions: between public and private; zoe and bios; political freedom and social

20
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freedom. The critique of the abstractness of the Rights of Man critiques their apolitical or private
nature.
For Arendt, the refugees or stateless persons made human rights a practical political issue
for the first time because they no longer possessed any rights as citizens. But the plight of the
refugees was that, at the moment when they lost their rights as citizens, rather than being
protected by their human rights, they discovered that they had no rights at all. In her analysis,
Arendt makes and reiterates the claim that refugees or stateless persons are rightless. Arendt
contests the distinction ordinarily held between the terms refugee and stateless person. She writes
that, “the many and varied efforts of the legal profession to simplify the problem by stating a
difference between the stateless person and the refugee…were always defeated by the fact that
‘all refugees are for practical purposes stateless’.”23 Indeed, “the core of statelessness…is
identical with the refugee question.”24 In many cases, Arendt finds, it is preferable to be
classified as a stateless person, the more extreme of the two terms, and that “people took refuge
in statelessness…in order to remain where they were and avoid being deported to a
‘homeland’.”25 The difference in terminology principally served as a political expedient,
allowing states to recognize an individual as a ‘refugee’, rather than a ‘stateless person’, thus
bearing less responsibility, because refugees were a ‘temporary’ problem, to be repatriated or
naturalized, unlike their stateless counterparts. But rightless was not the particular plight of one
or the other group. Refugees and stateless persons alike, suffering the loss of their home and of
government protection, were threatened with rightlessness. Describing the rightless, Arendt

23 Arendt,

“Origins,” 281. fn, 28 quoting John Simpson “The Refugee Problem”
“Origins,” 279.
25 Arendt, “Origins,” 279.
24 Arendt,
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writes, “their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them;
not that they are oppressed, but that nobody wants to oppress them”26. The plight of the rightless
is not that they are subject to injustices, as injustices are commonly understood—committed
wrongs—but that no notion of wrong, strictly speaking, any longer applies to them—“they live
outside the scope of all tangible law”27. The rightless suffer the unprecedented wrong of
“expulsion from humanity altogether”28.
The rightless person is conceived as “‘beyond oppression,’ beyond any account in terms
of conflict and repression, or law and violence”, beyond politics altogether. In response to this
account, Rancière says that “as a matter of fact, there were people who wanted to oppress them
and laws to do this,” and that this, “conceptualization of a ‘state beyond oppression’ is much
more a consequence of Arendt’s rigid opposition between the realm of the political and the realm
of private life”29 than a worldly fact. The conceptual category of rightlessness, which Arendt
creates in an attempt to account for the situation of the refugee, is a figment of her rigid
theoretical framework of politics.
Arendt’s framework, in which the rightless person exists in a state of exception, beyond
politics, is her separation of the political from the private realm of necessity—the realm of
strictly individual and biological concerns—in an “attempt to preserve the political from the
contamination of private, social, apolitical life.”30 But this separation is an attempt to preserve a
‘pure’ politics, and “ultimately makes it vanish in the sheer relation of state power and individual

26 Arendt,

“Origins,” 296.
“Origins,” 293.
28 Arendt, “Origins,” 297.
29 Rancière, "Who Is the Subject,” 299.
30 Rancière, "Who Is the Subject,” 301.
27 Arendt,
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life”31. A ‘pure’ politics such as this actually “depopulates the political stage” of possible political
subjects, excluded by the a priori determination what is and is not included in the realm of
politics; this determination that presupposes who is a political subject and what the subject of
politics is.
Politics subsumed by state power, which rules directly over individuals, uninterrupted by
political action, cannot properly be called politics or political in Rancière’s understanding. By
presupposing who and what constitute the political, politics vanishes into what Rancière refers to
as the logic of the police, which, accompanying state power, is called a process of consensus.
Theory which conceives the political as a sphere, self contained and definite, always presupposes
a “specific a way of life” that is political, thus clearing the stage of the “always ambiguous
actors” who, in their very ambiguity, constitute Rancière’s politics. Their ambiguity is important
because, for Rancière, political actors are not given, they have no specific way of life. The
political actor, in the sense of someone who enacts politics, is ambiguous because this someone
can be anyone, and for that reason the someone can never be determined in advance. The
ambiguous actor, the anyone, is lost in the rule of state power, which preordains who is and is not
a political actor. Rancière’s conception of politics coalesces around the figure of the ambiguous
actor. Describing this actor, and properly understanding the relationship between this actor and
the political, constitutes setting “the question of what politics is on a different footing”, asking
the question of politics differently—as Rancière does this in his title: who is the subject of the
rights of man?

31
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“That which truly [deserves] the name” politics interrupts established power and order
and governance—Rancière calls this “the practice of dissensuality and miscount”32. In thinking
about human rights, Arendt:

!
makes them a quandary which can be put as follows: either the rights of the citizens are
the rights of man—but the rights of man are the rights of the unpoliticized person; they
are the rights of those who have no rights, which amounts to nothing—or the rights of
man are the rights of the citizen, the rights attached to the fact of being a citizen of such
or such constitutional state. This means that they are the rights of those who have rights,
which amounts to a tautology.33

!
This is the perplexity and failure of the rights of man—that they don’t apply to those who need
them, who have no rights as citizens, and that they do apply to those who don’t need them, who
already have the rights of citizenship. As Arendt writes, “although everyone seems to agree that
the plight of [the refugees] consists precisely in their loss of the Rights of Man, no one seems to
know which rights they lost when they lost these human rights”;34 when it became politically
necessary, as a result of the mass appearance of rightless persons, to name the rights of man, they
could not be distinguished from the rights of citizens. But, as Rancière contests, this task that
Arendt confronts, of naming a right that would properly belong to man as such, rising out of the
quandary she makes of human rights, is misleading. The quandary appears legitimate and the

32
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task necessary “only at the cost of sweeping aside a third assumption that would escape the
quandary”35. This third option repoliticizes human rights against Arendt’s depoliticization.
Framed it inside of Arendt’s quandary, Rancière writes, “the Rights of Man are the rights of those
who have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have not.36”
This formulation, in its perplexity, initially appears akin to Arendt’s, but it behaves quite
differently. The contradiction Rancière’s phrase voices is its vitality rather than its
disqualification. Rancière is breaking the identity Arendt presupposes in the identification of
Man and Citizen and their rights. If Arendt’s quandary stems from the conviction that there are
certain rights which individuals have by virtue of being citizens and other certain rights which
are given simply by being human, and that these names describe different orders of existence—
specifically that the subject of human rights, Man, is a subject of human rights precisely because
he is not, or is no longer, a subject of the rights of citizens—and that rights can be named and
possessed in a definite sense at all, because the possessor of rights also possesses an identity that
entitles him to said rights—the identity of man or citizen—then Rancière’s formulation breaks
with all these convictions, and thus escapes Arendt’s quandary. Simply put, Arendt implies a
subject that is, “at once the source and bearer of…rights and would only use the rights that she or
he possesses.”37

!
!
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Rancière’s Rights
Rancière’s subject, on the other hand, at once has the rights he doesn’t have, and doesn’t
have the rights he has. This is a conflict not a paradox. It acknowledges the disparity between
“appearance and reality or law and fact”38, that while it may appear that everyone has certain
rights, in reality there are those from whom these rights are withheld. But the statement also
disputes the effectivity, or meaning of this withholding, for, “they have the rights that they have
not,” the withholding is flouted and the rights are possessed all the same. There is a disparity, a
gap in human existence—facts and reality present a different situation than is presented by
appearances and laws. In accordance with the disparity or gap between the apparent and the real,
between law and fact, is a double existence of rights. First there are “written rights…inscriptions
of the community as free and equal…part of the configuration of the given,” even though the
reality of a situation may belie these inscriptions. The inscriptions are the universal declarations
of rights, starting with the Declaration of Independence and Le Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme et du Citoyen in the eighteenth century, that declare the existence of a right quite apart
from the real instantiation of said right. Understood in one sense, the abstractness of these
declarations of rights, the flagrant discontinuity of law with fact, would reveal a failure or
deficiency of the right due to its inability to take reality into account, as in Arendt’s account of
the Rights of Man. Rancière specifically avoids this response. Instead, these “written rights” are
not evaluated by their efficacy or adequate representation of reality, but, in themselves, exist as
part of the given, and “what is given is not only a situation of inequality. It is also an inscription,
a form of visibility of equality”39. The importance of these “written rights” is not their efficacy or
38
39
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their description of reality but the gesture they make, towards the possibility of equality. Their
existence is the contradictory existence of equality and justice even in situations of deep
injustice. This existence establishes the gap previously referred to, between appearance and
reality—giving equality in situations of inequality, and justice in times of injustice. The
establishment of this gap reveals a discontinuity between the reality that limits rights and a
reality in which these rights are without limit. The inscription of equality, which establishes the
double reality of this gap, is, for Rancière, akin to the possibility of equality.
The other form of rights Rancière names is “the rights of those who make something of
that inscription”40. If the written form of rights is given and therefore passive, this form of rights
is active. But this form of rights is not characterized by mere “use”—the active demonstration of
given rights—it also includes the building of a case “for the verification of the power of the
inscription”41. Building a case for verification actualizes the possibility latent in “written rights”.
Verification is not the mere use of written rights, because such uses happen all the time and are
often overlooked, intentionally as much as not. Absent the verification, uses may simply be
exceptions that exempt certain individuals from the rule and leave the rule itself, the general
conditions, unchanged. The difference between the use of inscribed rights and the verification of
the power of the inscribed rights is the difference between trespassing on private land without
being noticed (having the right to be where one does not have the right to be) and trespassing
while simultaneously drawing attention to the act of trespassing in order to demonstrate that the
designation of the land as private is contingent and superficial, that one has the right to be on the
land even though it is private and one supposedly does not have the right to be on it, and that
40
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things could be entirely otherwise—the land is private by design not by nature. That is, the act of
trespass is accompanied by a declaration which proclaims that the trespass should not be viewed
as such, that the rules which designate private and public should be changed so that what is
considered trespassing would no longer be considered as such. The justification for this claim,
the proof of this its legitimacy, is in the act itself, which shows that rule does not reflect a
necessary reality but a contingent and superficial one. The verification demonstrates “the mere
contingency of equality.”42 Thus, a case for the verification of the power of written rights
necessarily includes the use of rights, but more specifically, is an argument against the situation
of injustice in which certain rights are invalid by demonstrating a situation in which these rights
are valid, or can be. The use of rights can demonstrate whether rights are, in reality, confirmed or
denied, but the case for verification demonstrates what this confirmation and denial mean—that
injustice and inequality are perpetuated by the denial of rights, and that equality and justice can
be given, and, in at least one sense, they already are given, demonstrated in the use of withheld
rights. The activity of verifying thus manifests a dispute in reality, “a division in the ‘common
sense’”43 of reality which, although denying the existence or validity of certain rights, cannot
erase them from “the configuration of the given”. Claude Lefort describes this when he says
“power may deny right, but it is incapable of depriving itself of its reference to it.”44 Rights can
be enacted even in their denial. This is the dispute manifest in Rancière’s phrase “the Rights of

42

Rancière, Jacques. “The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics.” In Reading Rancière: Critical Dissensus,
ed. by Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011), 4.
43 Rancière, "Who Is the Subject,” 304.
44 Lefort, Claude “Politics and Human Rights”The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy,
Totalitarianism, ed. John B. Thompson. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), 254.

!19
Man are the rights of those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they
have not”.
In a back and forth movement between the inscription of rights and the use and
verification of these rights, it can be demonstrated that even the denial of rights cannot prevent
these rights from being enacted. People can have the rights they have not. Thus rights are not
objects that can be possessed, simply taken away or bestowed. Rather, a right is a divided thing,
always split between its written existence and practical use; as such, it escapes possession. The
doubling of right (in the two forms of rights) means that a right always exceed the establishment
of its existence because it is established to the extent that it is limited. A right can be
demonstrated or enacted, performed or instantiated, by a bridging of the two forms, a back and
forth activity between the existence of written rights and a polemical argument for the validity of
these written rights, a case to verify the power of the written rights. This demonstrates, not
merely that certain rights are legitimate, but that the power of rights always exceeds the
boundaries of equality constructed by a society. The verification of the power of written rights
verifies that the power of these rights exceeds the facts or reality of a society and actually applies
to groups who are supposed to be outside the power of these rights.
What is described here as the building of a case for the verification of inscribed rights can
be thought of as the making visible, or manifesting, of the gap between appearance and reality,
law and fact, that is established by the simultaneous existence of inscriptions of right that give
equality, and of a reality in which this equality does not exist. Verification is alternately described
as an enacting, a staging, a manifesting, or a putting to the test. It shares many characteristics
with theories of civil disobedience, but is distinct, and is one of the essential elements of
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Rancière’s theory of rights and politics, because in the verification an equality that was
previously does not exist in reality is manifested in reality—it is an interruption in which
something is brought into the world that previously was not there. It does not simply break rules
in a negative sense, but positively creates a different situation in which different rules apply.
Crucial to this manifestation is the perception others, and the obvious drawback is that the
manifestation can always be perceived in the two ways described: negatively, as there mere
breaking of rules, as an infraction warranting of punishment, and positively, as the affirmation of
equality and of given inscriptions right, bringing the possibility of a new law into the world.
Inevitably the manifestation accrues both perceptions, one could not exist without the other. But
it is clearly insufficient in situations of inequality and in questions of human rights to simply say
that the demonstration of equality, the use of rights, will be seen both positively and negatively.
These situations are anything but ambivalent, so the question must be: how can the positive
perception of the manifestation equality can overwhelm the negative perception? Posing such a
question in the abstract is difficult because an answer to it must deal in the contextual details of a
situation—nonetheless the true significance of the act of verification is that it manifests a
disagreement where there had previously been none. Whether this disagreement is perceived as
such cannot be guaranteed, but the manifestation of the disagreement insists on a response. This
engagement—even in the negative—creates what Rancière would call a space for politics, and
creates a new dialogue by virtue of the new engagement.
To be outside the scope of rights, outside the realm of equality or freedom, is to be
outside the realm of politics, in what would be called the private or the realm of necessity. But
freedom and equality are what Rancière calls political predicates—“open predicates: they open
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up a dispute about what they exactly entail and who they concern in which cases”—which means
that politics is always concerned with “the sphere of implementation for these predicates”,
bringing back into question the line demarcating the extensions of the realm of politics, and the
identification of those who political and those who are not, questioning the boundaries which
separate and distinguish one human from another on the basis of their qualification to take part in
politics.45 By limiting the extent of politics to a specific sphere, the extent of freedom and
equality are also limited to this domain. But for Rancière, politics is the fight over these limits,
not the institution of a stable sphere in which they are protected.
Rancière often returns to the example of Olympe de Gouges who published the
Déclaration des Droits de la Femme et de la Citoyenne in response to the Déclaration des Droits
de l’Homme et du Citoyen during the French Revolution. She declared that “if women are
entitled to go to the scaffold, they are entitled to go to the assembly”. Women could be, and were,
executed for political crimes such as treason, for being enemies of the revolution, but were
disbarred from participation in political life because of their role in domestic life. They belonged
to the private sphere and thus were deemed unfit for “the purity of political life.” Olympe de
Gouges’s declaration pointed out this paradox and manifested the confrontation between its two
realities: the one in which women belonged to the private sphere, were unfit for politics and
unequal to men, and the other in which they were as equal as men. Forcing these two situations
together reveals the gap in reality. The product of this demonstration is the making Rancière
refers to when he says that the second form of rights are “the rights of those who make
something of that inscription”—Rancière calls this activity dissensus.
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Dissensual Politics
Rancière thinks of politics “under the concept of dissensus,” the practice of dissensuality
and miscount, in order to set the question of what politics is on new footing.46 If politics is a
form of dissensus, it must be clarified that dissensus refers to both the activity of politics or
political action, what a political subject does, and the subject of politics, what politics is about.
The former of these is already articulated in the conception of the twin existence of rights. A
right is not a tangible whole, there is always an argument over what a right is, who it applies to,
where and under what circumstances. The activity that bridges the two forms of rights,, the case
for the verification of the power of written rights—which demonstrates that they actually apply
to those they aren’t supposed to apply to (those outside the realm of the political)—is the staging
of a dissensus. It makes visible the disjunction, the existence of two orders of existence in one
order. Rancière calls this “a division in the ‘common sense’: a dispute about what is given, about
the frame within which we see something as given”, and more succinctly “the putting of two
worlds in one and the same world.”47 The concept of dissensus attends to disagreements and
divisions in every ruling and ordering of society. Dissensual politics deals with these
disagreements and makes them visible—not as a conflict of interest between groups but as a
conflict “concerning the common”48—without settling them. The question is not of which groups
deserve what within a given common, not that an underprivileged group should be given some
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additional privilege or other, but that this group is excluded from access to the common by virtue
of the rules that govern its very configuration. The common is “a specific world, a specific form
of experience in which some things appear to be political objects, some questions political issues
or argumentations and some agents political subjects”49. The common describes the specific
hierarchies, givens, and rules of a society. Politics is the “configuration” and reconfiguration of
this specific world by means of presenting the existence of other possible worlds, different
configurations of what counts as political. If a conflict is presented as a issue of private interests
then it has no bearing on equality or inclusion in the political, on the organization of the
common. A conflict over private interests might augment the distribution of privileges, a slight
increase in wages or working conditions, but the common will remain unchanged, the general
limits of inclusion, what and who counts as political—which, at its most basic level is a question
about “who speaks and who does not speak”50. Indeed the augmentation resulting from questions
concerning private interests are not political, for they leave untouched the question of equality,
and can spoken of best as appeasements which the equal dole out to the unequal, the political
persons dole out to the apolitical persons.
If, instead of acting on behalf of a private interest, if a laborer does not act as a laborer,
but instead acts as a legitimate political subject, he demonstrates that he is political, even if he is
excluded from the political. De Gouges, in framing her conflict as a political conflict, revealing
an exclusion in politics rather than demanding a particular interest, acted in just this way.
Dissensual action makes visible a basic division and transgresses it, showing that it need not be.
It’s “positive content is its dismissal of any difference between those who ‘live’ in such or such a
49
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sphere of existence, between those who are or are not qualified for political life”51. In this sense,
the measure of politics is equality and the basic criteria of political action is enacting the mere
contingency of equality, that the equality manifested in a society is dependent on the society’s
particular configuration, the naming of some things and people political and others not. Politics
demonstrates that this configuration, the scope of equality and the extent of the political, could
be completely different.
The boundaries which designate what the extent of equality, the common, is, is the
subject of dissensual politics. Political action makes visible the gap between the reality of rights
and their inscription, makes visible both the world that withholds rights and a world that does not
—a world whose common is expanded—and constructs a polemic against the former on the basis
of the latter. Politics “consists in blurring the boundaries” of equality and the common.52 All of
this depends upon dissensus’s basic assumption, or insight, of a doubling, an excess, a division.
Because rights do not exist in only one form, they cannot be withheld. Because there are internal
and hidden divisions in a society, different configurations of a society can be made visible to
contest the existing one. Addressing the question of the political subject under the concept of
dissensus leads Rancière to two other doublings, the identification of another gap.

!
The Subject of Politics and the Count
Concerned with the “rejection of every difference that distinguishes between people who
‘live’ in different spheres of existence”, with re-partitioning the boundaries inscribed by different
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spheres (literally with “the disagreement about what politics is”53), politics opens the political
sphere, the space of equality, to include more subjects. As such the term sphere falls away—
Rancière writes that politics, “is not a sphere but a process”54. This process is the verification, the
back and forth movement, the staging or enacting of a dissensus which intervenes in the
exclusion of spheres. The process puts “two worlds in one and the same world” and questions the
boundaries of a given world, and leaves open the question of who can engage in this process,
who is the subject of politics. Rancière’s answer to this question is anyone, anyone can become a
political subject, which he elaborates by conceiving of two different doublings: the doubling of
the population, the “separation of the whole of the community from itself” articulated in
Rancière’s concept of the “count”; and the doubling of the individual who becomes a political
subject himself, what Rancière calls “the process of subjectivization.”55
The count also establishes a people. Counting is a way of including individuals in the
common of a community. The included and the counted are the same, and inclusion is the basis
for the recognition of equality—being counted is coextensive to being a subject of politics. But
every count also creates an ‘uncounted’, a population of individuals who are excluded from the
common, from the people, and from politics and equality. A “division between those who are
worthy or not worthy of doing politics”56 is inscribed in the very process of counting. Attending
to the division inherent in counting—that every count produces a counted, or included,
population and an uncounted, or excluded population—Rancière concludes that there are two
ways of counting, doubling the form of counting in order to (ac)count for the doubling of the
53
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population (the counted and the uncounted). Rancière writes, “the people is a name for two
opposite things: demos and ethnos”, names which coincides with two opposite ways of counting
the people—the political count and the police count. Ethnos, the police count, names the people
“as a given body opposed to other such bodies”, an exclusive identification wrought by a shared
characteristic—nationality, birth, origin, religious affiliation; demos, the political count, names
the people “conceived as a supplement to the parts of the community—what I call a count of the
uncounted.” This is a count of the people that ignores identification with one group or another,
ignores the qualifications of birth or wealth, “mere contingencies,” from which hierarchy and the
division between those worthy of doing politics and those who are unworthy of it, spring.57
The count of the uncounted creates an “empty” and “supplementary part…that separates
the political community from the count of the parts of the population”58. The police count, which
counts the population as the sum of its parts, is not overruled but the count of the uncounted—it
is supplemented by this additional count. Political action puts two worlds in opposition to one
another, making visible the gap between law and fact, and at the same time “opposes two
counts,” making visible the gap between the counted and the uncounted. In this process of
making visible, it is shown that the uncounted are actually counted, even though they are not
counted within the police count, and are thus part of the common and worthy of politics.
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But the count of the uncounted, the demos, “is not given once and for all,” not definitely
established in a distinct sphere as is the ethnos, the count of the police. The count of the
uncounted is the “ongoing process of differentiation from the ethnos,” continually interrupting
the ethnos with reassertion of the demos.59 Police logic ousts “surplus subjects and [replaces]
them with real partners, social groups, identity groups”—defined subjects existing in and
belonging to definite spheres. Thus it constantly threatens to oust the demos, constituted, not by
real partners, but by anyone. Politics always takes place in these police spaces because it is the
activity of contesting them—politics has no proper place of its own. The demos asserts itself
against, and from within, the definite identification of the police.
The empty and supplementary part of the count of the uncounted, separated from the
people counted as the sum of their parts, includes anyone specifically as anyone. A political
subject is not a given individual, but the process of subjectivization, which anyone can perform.
The count of the uncounted is not a prescriptive count, as the police count is, but an empty count
—meaning that it is open to anyone because no group or individual is inscribed in it. It creates a
surplus identity that can be taken on or performed in the process of a political argument. The
surplus identity is simply the identity of one who has been counted, included, which is opened to
the uncounted by the count of the uncounted. The surplus identity is in excess of the identities
counted by the police, and thus calls into question the validity of that count and who is included
in it. The process of subjectivization is the process of taking on, enacting, a surplus name at the
same time as, inevitably, enacting the police name, and bridging the gap between the two names,
the two counts of the population, making both visible. This act disputes the police count’s claim
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to have included the whole of the population—to have accounted for every definite identity—by
confronting it with the excess, litigious identity of the uncounted. “The political
supplementation…the ‘power of anyone’” confronts the functioning power of states, predicated
on the unequal order of the police count, and disputes it by manifesting the unaccounted for, the
excluded who nonetheless cannot be silenced.60 The ‘power of anyone’ disrupts the police count,
which insists on anyone being someone, on sweeping aside excess names so that everyone has a
definite identity and exists in a demarcated sphere, thus reducing politics—the blurring of the
boundaries separating spheres and identities—to nothing. The police vision, in which there is no
doubling, in which law and fact are identified, where law is “identical to the natural life of
society,” dissolving the divisions inherent in human existence, is what Rancière calls
consensus.61 Consensus is the aim of police logic and the opposite of dissensus—it reduces
everything to one definite identity and one proper place, “plugging the intervals and patching the
possible gaps between appearance and reality or law and fact.”62 For Rancière consensus is not a
manner of “settling political conflicts by forms of negotiation and agreement”, it is the reduction
of substantive, political, disagreement to the “adjustment of interests” between social groups,
negotiated by experts.63 The basic question of who and what are included and excluded in the
common, the question of equality is erased by consensus. Consensus “[attempts] to get rid of
politics.”64
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Democracy and Politics
Political dissensus is a theory of democracy. For Rancière, “democracy is not a political
regime…democracy is the regime of politics in the form of a relationship defining a specific
subject,”65 that is, democracy is not one form of political organization among others, it is the
only political form of organization. The democratic subject is the subject “who partakes ‘in
ruling and being ruled’”, a subject defined by the by a relationship to rule, or power, that ruptures
any correspondence between rule and qualification to rule. Democracy identifies the demos, the
count of the uncounted, the empty part separated from the population, with anyone—a subject
devoid of any qualification to rule, equally qualified to rule as to be ruled precisely because it
lacks all qualification. This “[grounds] politics in the action of supplementary subjects that are
surplus in relation to any (ac)count of the parts of society,” and grounds democracy in the
equality of ruler and ruled.66 The process of subjectivization, the subject of politics, is identified
with democratic process, and democracy is identified with the political supplementation that
confronts the functioning of state power with the power of anyone, “which grounds [democracy]
at the cost of disrupting it”67. Democracy is disruptive because politics are disruptive, and
democracy is the organization founded on this disruptive power, politic or the power of anyone.
Democracy is organized around political dissensus, opening up the gap in which anyone can
become the subject of politics.68
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Rancière discusses rights and the subject of rights in the same terms as he discusses the
political and the subject of politics. Freedom and equality are the subject of both rights and
politics. Rancière is able to conflate rights and politics in this way because of his attention to
democracy, and his identification of democracy with politics. The principle of democracy, its
exceptional characteristic, is the affirmation of the demos, of “the whole of those who are
nothing, who do not have specific properties allowing them to exercise power”69. In effect, this is
the affirmation of a radical equality, of the equality of anyone with anyone. Certainly there are
differences between people, this is the basis of the police logic which is contested, not erased, in
democracy. The radical equality of democracy is the acceptance of a basic capacity of anyone to
be political. Because “democracy is the institution of politics”70, the universal measure of politics
is equality71. Equality is not a rule or arkhê, that governs politics, rather it is the presupposition
of the principle of democracy, a “supposition that must be verified continuously” by politics.72
Thus politics can be thought of as the practice of inclusion, always animated by a division: the
included and the excluded; freedom and oppression; equality and inequality. Dissensus contains
and articulates this essential division as well as the process of bridging it.
This coincides with the discourse of right because rights, in their many specificities and
varied forms, are always affirmations of equality. To that extent, the pursuit of rights always
manifests the division between equality and inequality, freedom and oppression. In this model
the question of politics becomes identical with the question of rights—the subject of politics
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identical to the subject of rights. Thus the question: “who is the subject of the Rights of Man?”
garners the same response as the question of who is the subject of politics—indeed Rancière
writes that the “the question of the Rights of Man—more precisely, the question of their
subject…is the subject of politics as well.”73
The names which are specifically invoked in the declaration of rights—man and citizen—
are thus political names. The process of subjectivization which manifests the difference, the gap,
between two worlds or social orders, is specifically conceived of as taking place between the
names man and citizen. The difference between these very names “is the opening of an interval
for political subjectivization”—they are political names, that is, surplus names, “whose extension
and comprehension are uncertain and which open for that reason the space of a test or
verification74”. The names man and citizen concentrate within themselves the doubling of the
count and the doubling of rights—through these political names an ambiguous actor, anyone, can
enact the process of subjectivization by demonstrating their simultaneous inclusion and
exclusion as both a man and citizen. The power of the Rights of Man is in the gap between these
two names.

!
Arendt’s ‘Pure’ Politics
At the center of Rancière’s conception of politics and the Rights of Man is the power of
doubling. It is the dissensual insight that no order of things is given in the singular, because there
is a “difference between sense and sense: a difference within the same,”75 there is always a
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division in the equality of human affairs. This difference is the precondition for politics, and to
reduce it is to attempt to eradicate the political. Politics cannot be deduced from any common
capacity or nature of man—Aristotle’s attempt, describing man as a political animal by reason of
his capacity of speech already covered over a difference between speech and speech, the
unintelligible cries of necessity being separated and considered less human than the articulated
speech that bares on freedom and justice, a difference he instituted, and Arendt revived in the
distinction between zoe and bios.76 Rancière’s critique of Arendt documents how her account of
the Rights of Man, which is endemic to her account of politics in general, not only fails to
recognize the political significance of this division or doubling—fails to see politics as the
process that manifests and disputes the legitimacy of this division—but actively suppresses the
division, the doubling. This suppression is embodied in Rancière concept of police, consensus
and of pure politics.
‘Pure’ politics identifies the political with a definite sphere or way of life, and, attempting
preserve the political from the contamination of the private, it configures the political “as a
collective body with its places and functions allotted according to the competences specific to
groups and individuals”77. Such a configuration assumes “that rights belong to definite or
permanent subjects” and leaves no room for the process of subjectivization of which politics
consists.78
Arendt sorts out the problem of politics in advance, of who and what are political, by
assuming a fitness that conjoins definite individuals to definite stations and identities in society.
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She reduces political names to police names by defining their “extension and comprehension”
and reduces potentially ambiguous actors to subjects of a single defined identity—obfuscating
the disruptive role of dissensual politics in favor of a definite sphere of pure politics, which
ultimately identifies “the political with state institutions and governmental practice.”79
Consensus and police logic are inherent to this conceptualization of ‘pure’ politics.
Arendt treats divisions—between citizen and man, public and private, political and apolitical,
bios and zoe, subject of rights and rightless—as descriptions of reality rather than as disjunctions
in reality that produce disagreement and a potential for the manifestation of other realities. This
rehearses the process of consensus, shoring up the gap between these divisions.
In her analysis of the refugee, Arendt claims the existence of rightless individuals. This
stems from the conception of a dyadic relationship between a ‘rightless’ subject and a subject
who has rights. Favoring the identities of these two subjects, Arendt disregards the gap formed
between them. The gap is the space in which rights can be claimed, in which a political subject
can inhabit both identities. By filling in this gap, rightlessness becomes an existential state of
exclusion from political action and the political altogether. Being political, inclusion in the
political, the possibility of politics, is not conceived as a process open to anyone, but as
contingent upon a specific identity and the possession of rights.
This is the point at which Arendt arrives in “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man.” She
blames the emergence of rightlessness on the development of the nation-state system: “it was a
problem not of space but of political organization. Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so
long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had reached a stage where
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whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself
thrown out of the family of nations altogether.” For her, being “thrown out of the family of
nations altogether” means losing possession of the identity of citizen, and with it, access to
politics— falling back on the identity of man. This analysis clearly demonstrates the conception
of politics as a specific sphere one inhabits, or, alternatively, from which one is excluded.
Inclusion in political life is contingent on qualifications (economic, intellectual,
hereditary…), and upon this contingency the differentiation of the human being into hierarchical
categories can occur. Rancière calls “the trap…of an ontological destiny of the human animal.”80
The logic which distinguishes humans upon these continent qualification leads to a situation in
which some humans are considered political and some are not, and this identification is taken,
not as a political problem, but as a distinction of anthropological or ontological significance, a
depoliticized distinction. The ultimate consequence of the process of consensus and police logic
is “the radical suspension of politics”—a suspension manifest in Arendt’s concept of
rightlessness.81
This depoliticization (which is a naturalization) of social hierarchy prioritizes the police
count, which counts the population as the sum of its parts—each part identified on the basis of
qualifications and hierarchies—and excludes the demos, the uncounted. Thus Arendt’s critique of
human rights, Rancière writes, “actually was a critique of democracy.”82 Arguing against the
confusion of abstract, apolitical rights with real rights, the confusion of “political freedom,
opposed to domination” with “social freedom, opposed to necessity”, and the contamination of
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the political sphere with the social sphere, is actually an argument against democracy, whose
principle is the equality of anyone with anyone, and thus always overrides, rather than inscribes,
these doublings or divisions. The power of anyone, which establishes the subject who partakes
both in ruling and being ruled, is pushed out in favor of clearly identified subjects, a defined
relation of rulership.
Rancière’s conception of democracy, as evidenced in its relation to Lefort’s work, stems
from a tradition of political thought in France that mostly emerged in the latter half of the
twentieth century, thinking of democracy from the its relation to totalitarianism, and responding
to the events of May ’68. Lefort is one of the major figures in this tradition, a thinker deeply
influenced by Arendt’s work. It is interesting to note that much of Rancière’s repudiation of
Arendt can already be found articulated, in a less concentrated fashion, in an essay Lefort wrote
in order to retrieve the rights of man from Karl Marx’s early critique of them in The Jewish
Question. In Lefort’s essay, Politics and Human Rights (Droit de l’Homme et Politique), the
argument against interpreting divisions and doubled relationships (the subject of rights and the
rightless) as descriptive of realities rather than conflicts in reality is already anticipated. Lefort
writes of Marx, describing why he fails to understand the Rights of Man, that “he brings law
down to the level of empirical reality, this being a reality of individual relationships, and thus
turns it into a device intended to preserve those relationships.”83 Here also Lefort is already
arguing that the power of rights is not in their description of empirical reality—that their
existence above this realm is their power, and that in this way they can provoke change in the
empirical reality of relationships. Lefort writes that “rights cannot be disassociated from the
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awareness of rights.” As such rights are not properties, and conception Lefort rejects explicitly
when he argues against “anchoring human rights in the individual,” for to do so removes their
political nature and thus creates a false antagonism between rights and politics.84 To do this, one
becomes “unable to conceive of the difference between totalitarianism and democracy,”85
similarly to the depoliticization Agamben, by way of Arendt, effects on human rights.
Yet Lefort, who was deeply concerned with human rights, and read Arendt’s work on the
subject, did not apply these critiques to her. Certainly he did not embrace all of her work, but,
although he makes reference to it, he didn’t critique The Perplexities of the Rights of Man, as
Rancière does by way of some of Lefort’s arguments.
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Chapter II
Arendt’s Political Thinking
In a speech on Gotthold Lessing, Arendt describes his “self-thinking” [selbstdenken] as
having a secret, perhaps unconscious link to action, in that “both action and thought occur in
movement and that, therefore, freedom underlies both”86. This model of thinking is contrasted to
the stoic model of thought—“not so much a retreat from action to thinking as an escape from the
world into the self.”87 Lessing took up thinking rather than acting, but he this was not a Stoic
retreat from the world into his self, for although “it is in action that men primarily experience
freedom in the world,”88 by maintaining a connection between thought and action he remained
engaged with the world. Thus, thinking, Lessing was able to preserved action’s freedom of
movement in the world so that his experience of tough was an experience of the world not of the
self.89 As a political thinker, Arendt also thought in this manner, for she strove to encounter the
world as it is and think through its political complexities. Lessing’s self-thinking, to the extent
that it engaged with the world, was “essentially polemical”, and directed towards an “anticipated
dialogue with others.”90 The aim of this polemical thought is to stimulate thinking in others, not
to transmit conclusion about the world. Thus Lessing “never [bound] his thinking to results.”91
Results or conclusions provide a final solution to a problem, stilling the movement of thought
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and thus cutting off thought’s relation to action, which is its relation to the world.92 The absence
of movement in thinking is the affirmation of a single perspective, it gives rise to a definite world
view and cannot help being ideological. Arendt describes this as “a closed, integrated,
organically grown and cultivated individual who then looks around to see where in the world the
most favorable place for his development might be, in order to bring himself into harmony with
the world by detour of thought.”93 In contrast, Lessing’s self-thinking seeks neither integrations,
organic individual growth, or harmony with the world. Lessing’s is a “partisanship for the world”
which means that to judge and understand everything in its worldly context and circumstances,
as opposed to extracting an object from the world and thinking of it in terms of an ideal system—
producing a truth.94 To think of everything in terms of its worldly circumstances is to be
constantly in flux, for the circumstances of the world constantly change.
The context of Arendt’s speech on Lessing was her acceptance of the Lessing Prize,
bestowed in 1959 by the Free City of Hamburg. Taking the occasion to stress the human’s
relationship to the world, Arendt says at the start of her speech, “the honor [of receiving an
award] not only reminds us emphatically of the gratitude we owe the world; it also, to a very
high degree, obligates us to it…by accepting it we…are accepting a kind of commitment to [the
world].95” Arendt, no less than Lessing, embodies such a commitment to the world in her writing
and political activity. Arendt illustrates what such a commitment entails in this speech by
describing Lessing’s thinking activity. That she is consciously committed to this model of
thought is evidenced in, among other places, her proposal in the introduction to The Human
92 Arendt,
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Condition: “to think what we are doing.”96 Here to think adheres to doing, articulating the
connection between activity and movement, and thought’s engagement with the world.
Approaching Arendt’s work without taking into account her conception of thinking risks
ignoring an essential aspect of it. The polemical, questioning, and provocative mode of her work
is as important as the theoretical structures and conceptual determinations. Questions move
Arendt’s work, she thinks through and from questions rather than resolving them. Her
understanding of history as, “a story of events and not of forces or ideas with predictable
courses” is only one such example of this.97 “The tangible unexpectedness of the event” breaks
predictable processes—forcing one to move from event to event, as from question to question—
for each event calls into question what can always appear as the inexorable movement of
history.98 For this reason, contradiction is not the manifestation of mistake or failure in Arendt’s
thinking, it is inevitable in thinking through the movement and specificity of the world—one
might call it the very evidence of thought. Along with Lessing, Arendt could have said, “I am not
duty-bound to resolve the difficulties I create. May my ideas always be somewhat disjunct, or
even appear to contradict one another, if only they are ideas in which readers will find material
that stirs them to think for themselves”99.
This approach resonates even in her first published book in English, written before either
The Human Condition or her speech at the reception of the Lessing Prize. In a 1958 newsletter
written on the occasion of the second publication, in a revised edition of The Origins of
Totalitarianism, Arendt called it a political book as opposed to a historical book. In the
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newsletter Arendt explains how she had initially felt that, while writing Origins, she was writing
a historical book, but was unsatisfied with this because, although she dealt with historical events,
she wrote, “not in order to save and conserve and render fit for remembrance, but on the
contrary, in order to destroy.”100 That is, she used history, not with the intent to preserve it as it
was experienced when it happened, but in order to create a polemical argument about the current
time—history was explicitly viewed in terms of its relation to the world, from the “vantage-point
of the present.”101 Realizing that this was a political activity, Arendt called Origins a political
book.
In the same newsletter she also writes that, “the mood and style of the whole book,” is
one of, “inconclusiveness.”102 Inconclusiveness is a surprising characterization for a book as
forceful and well researched as Origins, but together with her treatment of history, it is indicative
that, even at this stage in her career, Arendt was lead by some version of Lessing’s selbstdenken.
Political thinking thinks of everything in terms of its circumstances in the world and, because
these circumstances inevitably changes, is inconclusive. Because it seeks engages with the world
as it is, destroying history in order to make a polemic that says something about the present, it is
open, in turn, to the endless eventfulness of history and the destruction that future political
thinking, premised on different circumstances, will visit upon history. Approaching Origins with
its polemical task in mind, treating it as a political book intended to elicit debate, not as a
theoretical text that imparts conclusions, opens Rancière’s critique of its ninth chapter and the
broader argument he makes on its basis to reconsideration. Of course, the text of Origins is not
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immune to critique because of its political, inconclusive, or destructive character, but by
reframing the context in which it is read and responded to, the statements and arguments in the
book are opened up to more expansive interpretations.
In a short response to a critique of Rancière made by Michael Dillon, Dean Mathiowetz
distinguishes between a register of critical theory, and one of political thinking which entails a
polemical quality.103 The value of the latter register is that, in its provocation to argument, it
opens up possibilities in the thought with which it engages, rather than dismissing it and setting it
aside.104 Arendt’s work carries with it what Mathiowetz calls an, “invitation to political
thinking,” and although Rancière writes in a polemical mode himself, he seems at times to
neglect the opportunity this aspect of her writing provides. Andrew Schapp’s correction of
Rancière’s evaluation of Arendt’s tone—one of “bitter irony” not “contempt”—appears as an
insignificant adjudication in his treatment of the conflict between Arendt and Rancière, but the
distinction between irony and contempt is quite relevant.105 Where contempt refers to a single
subject and perception of that subject, irony speaks in several registers at once, proliferating the
possible responses, opening up the space of discussion. The activity of opening up animates
Rancière’s thought, but he seems to miss this same activity in Arendt’s writing. The
misunderstanding, taking irony for contempt, is indicative of a broader misunderstanding of
Arendt’s of writing that colors Rancière’s argument against her treatment of the Rights of Man.
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Arendt’s Critique of Burke
In his critique, Rancière draws attention to a conceptualization of belonging in Arendt’s
work, and to the significant role it plays in her analysis of the rightless person. For Rancière, her
references to Edmund Burke in “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man” attest to this—it was
Burke who first made the argument that real rights came from within the nation, were the rights
an Englishman derived by virtue of belonging to England, whereas human rights were an
abstraction springing from nowhere, and not be relied on.106 This idea, “that the only real rights
are the rights given to the citizens of a nation by their belonging to that nation”, as Rancière puts
it, is based on the assumption that “rights belong to definite or permanent subjects”107. So
framed, Arendt’s idea of belonging is an extension of the relations of property, that of possession
and possessor, object and owner, into a theory of rights and politics.108 Against this, Rancière can
contrast his more complicated conception of the relation between a subject and his rights. A
significant amount of secondary writing on Arendt’s critique of human rights takes, like
Rancière, her reference to Burke as an endorsement of his argument,109 but this assumption is
not, in fact, borne out by her text—Arendt’s reference to Burke’s argument is not an accord with
it. By understanding the place Burke’s argument properly holds in Arendt’s thinking, her
conceptualization of belonging and The Rights of Man can be reformulated, chiefly with
reference to her concept of “the right to have rights”.
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In his opposition to the abstraction of the Rights of Man, Burke conceived of liberty and
rights around the concept of inheritance.110 In this vision rights are an inheritance received from
a nation and ones ancestry and bequeathed upon ones posterity. This vision “[signifies] the direct
acceptance of the feudal concept of liberty as the sum total of privileges inherited together with
the title and land.”111 By basing them upon inheritance, rights are, like the feudal understanding
of liberty, manifest as the passing down of privileges and property, from one generation to next—
these privileges and properties owned as possessions within a family. Invoking this feudal
practice in his conception of rights as the rights of Englishmen, Burke “enlarged the principle of
these privileges to include the whole English people”, augmenting the liberty of the nobility in
feudal times, their privileges, to encompass the whole of the English people, so that the English
nation appeared, at least to itself, as a nation of nobility among mere nations.112 Arendt writes
that as a “consequence of this assimilation of noble standards…the English brand of racethinking was almost obsessed with inheritance theories and their modern equivalent,
eugenics”113. In other words, Arendt credits the original formulation of rights in terms of
inheritance, based on the feudal model of nobility, as the beginnings of the development of
English race-thinking, a development “which may be traced back to…Edmund Burke”114.
Arendt holds a firm distinction between race-thinking and racism, race-thinking is one of
many free opinions, whereas racism is an ideology, “[differing] from a simple opinion in that it
claims to possess either the key to history or the solution to the ‘riddles of the universe’ or the
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intimate knowledge of the hidden universal laws which are supposed to rule nature and man.”115
She likens the relation of one to the other as of a “shadow accompanying the development of the
comity of European nations, until [race-thinking] finally grew to be the powerful weapon for the
destruction of those nations,” that is racism.116 Given this understanding of race-thinking, it is
hardly plausible that Arendt would endorse Burke’s concept of rights. Separated from Burke’s
account of the abstraction of the Rights of Man, Arendt account of human rights becomes must
less intuitive, and Rancière’s critique less assured. Still, Arendt does write that the facts and
reflections she presents in “The Perplexities,” “offer what seems [a]…belated confirmation of the
famous argument with which Edmund Burke opposed the French Revolution’s Declaration of the
Rights of Man,” and that, “the pragmatic soundness of Burke’s concept seems to be beyond
doubt.”117 Understanding these statements in their context, they may be seen, not in
correspondence to a positive argument Arendt endeavors to make affirming Burke’s of vision of
human rights, but to an analytic description of what human rights, which failed when put to the
political test, were or are. This latter description might be called the first part of “The
Perplexities.” Indeed, “The Perplexities” primarily consists of two parts, the first largely
containing this historical and analytic depiction of the Rights of Man, and the second principally
an argument regarding the possibility for a different vision of human rights. Contrary to what the
name part implies, these two parts do not exist in strict separation, one following on the other,
but are woven together throughout the section—thus, notwithstanding Burke’s appearance in the
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last few pages of the section, he properly relates to what is being called the first part of “The
Perplexities.”
Rancière primarily objects to the first part of “The Perplexities,” Arendt’s analysis and
description of the rights of man, and seems to ignore the second part, which attempts to conceive
of a human rights that could be politically viable, echoing Rancière’s effort against an apolitical
conception of human rights. To further clarify the distinction between the two parts of “The
Perplexities” it may be useful to extrapolate from her statement of purpose in the 1951 preface to
Origins, in which she proposes to comprehend the central events of our times. For Arendt,
“comprehension…means the unpremeditated, active facing up to, and resisting of, reality—
whatever it may be.”118 Following the double act of comprehension—facing up to, and resisting
—what is called the first part of “The Perplexities” can be understood as the facing up to of
reality, and the second part as the active resisting of it.

!
Facing Up to Reality
The first part primarily consists of a historical narrative Arendt establishes, detailing the
particular way in which the Rights of Man have come into existence, and weaving this account
into the story of the modern day refugee, which appears as the central story of human rights. It
faces up to the novel existence of refugees, the rightless, and the declared existence of the Rights
of Man—the fact that both exist in the world at the same time without precluding the existence
of the others. The existence of the Rights of Man should contradict the existence of rightless
individuals, if all human have rights by virtue of being human rightlessness should be
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impossible, but the Rights of Man did not prevent the emergence of rightlessness. The rightless
cause Arendt to investigate the now dubious existence of the Rights of Man, but as the second
part of “The Perplexities” attests, the rightless do not preclude the possibility of human rights.
One might easily imagine this section of Origins being titled “The Failure,” or “The
Disintegration” of the Rights of Man—but the title Arendt chose, “The Perplexities of the Rights
of Man,” reveals a commitment to facing these contradictions as they are manifested in the
world, as perplexities to confront rather than to resolving, which would likely result in
abandoning human rights; to resolve the perplexities would be to “deny the outrageous” or
“explain phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the impact of reality and the shock
of experience are no longer felt,” Arendt’s description of activities that fail at the task of
comprehension.119 Comprehension must simply face this contradiction as a contradiction that,
however hard to contemplate, exists. Facing up to it means understanding it, not by seeking a
cause from which it follows as an inevitable effect, but by understanding the present in terms of
its origins in the past, origins which become origins only in hindsight, after the events of the
present have occurred.120 The unpredictableness of events, of which history is made up, do not
lead to other events in any necessary way, as one may speak of outcomes following from origins.
But, in hindsight, events can be traced back to other events as the conditions for their possibility.
Origins, not by a law of causality and historical necessity, but by fact that they made possible the
circuitous route of human actions and decisions that lead from one event to the next—actions
and decisions could have been entirely otherwise. Thus the origin of Arendt’s title should not
suggest “however faintly, a belief in historical causality, which I did not hold when I wrote the
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book and which I believe in even less today.”121 Understanding does not aim at finding an origin
or origins that necessarily caused a series of events to unfold, but rather, it focuses on the
irresistible facticity of the present, and from that discerns those resistible origins which, neither
causing nor necessitating anything, nonetheless made the present possible.
Arendt’s understanding of the history of the Rights of Man hinges on two crucial points,
of which the first is that there was an initial slippage in the image of Man. The Rights of Man
proclaimed “Man himself…their source as well as their ultimate goal,” making him, “the only
sovereign in matters of law.”122 At the same time, in the course of both the American and French
Revolutions, “the people was proclaimed the only sovereign in matters of government.”123 The
rights of the people were proclaimed in the name of Man, on the authority of Man, but,
reflexively, it was in the sovereign self-government of the people that the Rights of Man were
guaranteed—as a result the Rights of Man, as the basis of law, became subsumed into the
sovereign right of the people—the basis of government—so that “the people, and not the
individual, was the image of man”124. The implication of the substitution of the people for the
image of Man became clear at the moment when individuals emerged who were not attached to
any peoples, appearing only as—the rights of man did not in fact apply to the individual125.
Substituting the people, constituting a nation in the modern age, for the individual as the image
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of the rights of man meant that the question of human rights became inextricably bound up with
the question of the nation and national emancipation.126
This leads to the second point, which consists of Edmund Burke’s vision of rights. For
Burke rights are rooted in and sustained by definite national communities, and belong to
individuals along the model of feudal liberty, an extension of property relations to the concept of
rights.
These two fundamental points characterized the man of the Rights of Man, and the rights
of the Rights of Man. Rights were properties and Man was a people or a nation, thus these rights
could never have applied to individuals outside of any definite national community. Such
individuals were neither the man in whose name rights were declared, nor were any rights
available to them, for rights, as Burke argued, were only real, which is to say of practical
political significance, when guaranteed by a government to a subject belonging to that
government, analogous to the guarantee of property. The Rights of Man, which for so long had
been presumed to apply directly to men, humans as such, outside of the particularity of their
political status or identity, were revealed to be entirely unfit for the task demanded of them—
when humans rather than citizens appeared on the world stage.
Thus, the true significance of refugees, what made their appearance unique, was not that
they had lost their homes or the protection of their governments, for “in the long memory of
history [these experiences] look like everyday occurrences”127. What was unprecedented was
that, once lost, neither home nor government protection could be regained—that these refugees
126
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literally became homeless and, in losing government protections, were outside of legality
altogether. Only then did they become rightless. Arendt writes that “the calamity of the rightless
is…that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever…not that they are not equal before
the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even
to oppress them.”128 That the emergence of refugees coincided with the expansion of the nationstate system over the entire globe also made rightlessness possible. For rightlessness was a
problem, “not of space but of political organization. Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so
long a time considered under the image of a family of nations, had reached a stage where
whoever was thrown out of one of these tightly organized closed communities found himself
thrown out of the family of nations altogether.”129 The result of this total organization is that “we
have really started to live in One World. Only with a completely organized humanity could the
loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether.”130
The true and most extreme plight of the rightless is expulsion from humanity altogether. When
they lost their home and their legal status it was discovered that in the world’s total organization
there was no longer any surplus place to call home, no longer any surplus legal status to be
assumed. Under such conditions the loss of home and of legal status means the loss of all rights,
rightlessness, which is the loss of humanity altogether.
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This is Rancière’s principal objection and the basis of his critique of Arendt, the
conceptualization of a human status that is so thoroughly expelled from humanity as to be
“outside the pale of law,”131 a situation in which humans can actually lose “some of the most
essential characteristics of human life,” including the, “loss of the relevance of speech,” and the,
“loss of all human relationships,” the two human characteristics, defined by Aristotle, that have
since lead the human to be characterized as a political animal.132 All of which says that the
human can be expelled from humanity and expelled from politics, humans can lose the basic
capacity to act with other, to be political. For Arendt this means that, although the vicissitudes of
fortune may readmit certain of the rightless to humanity, the rightless themselves have lost the
capacity to claim readmission, to act politically even on their own behalf. But in focusing solely
on this analysis Rancière misses the overall movement of Arendt’s chapter towards its second
part. The first part is not a conclusion for Arendt, not something for which she argues (though it
itself is an argument), but the frame of her argument, the very thing which she is resisting.
It is quite true, as Rancière argues, that the rightless Arendt describes are only
conceivable within a framework that insists that the political is a distinct and separate space,
corresponding to the existence of a private sphere, equally separate and distinct. Only in such a
rigid structure could a conceptual category definitely excluded from both spheres be conceivable.
Indeed, the true implication of Arendt’s description of the refugee is not that it is outside of the
political, that this sphere is no longer given to it, but that it is outside of all spheres of human life,
private and public, and therefore expelled from humanity. This is the true sense of Arendt’s term
superfluous, which “means not to belong to the world at all”, and which can properly be applied
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to the rightless.133 The rightless person is not the only subject who Arendt conceives of as
superfluous. Superfluousness is the experience totalitarianism attempts to force upon its
population, a new form of domination which stems not from the mere isolation of individuals
from one another, which destroys the public realm, but the infliction of loneliness on individuals,
which “destroys private life as well” and creates the conditions for experience of
superfluousness, of not belonging to the world.134 Rancière’s conception of the political as a
process, rather than a sphere, expands the political so that it has no definite limits and anyone can
participate in it. This also makes a conceptual category beyond access to the political
inconceivable. Politics, in Rancière’s conception, is the capacity for staging a dissensus, putting
two worlds into one world, thus making visible the illegitimacy of certain exclusions by
presenting a world in which these exclusions do not exist—enacting “the mere contingency of
equality”135. This affirms that whatever is called equality in a given society is contingent on a
particular configuration of groups and givens, on the prioritization of some qualifications over
others, and thus always creates a corollary inequality or exclusion. Demonstrating the mere
contingency of equality allows for what is called ‘equality’ to be reconfigured and expanded.
Arendt’s equality is different from Rancière’s, but it is also always contingent. For her, equality
is also related to politics, but it exists only in the political space, the place in which politics
occurs, and is created by the people who come together in it—is manmade by definition.
Arendt’s equality is an artifice, fabricated to create a space for politics, which can only occur
among equals.136 Rancière’s equality is marshaled against such a space, challenging the
133
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exclusion created with the creation of equality within certain bounds. In Arendt’s conception,
politics, or being political, means “having a place in the world which makes opinions significant
and actions effective”137.
Rancière’s definition is more polemical and Arendt’s more broad and existential, but they
are not radically opposed. The difference is that in Arendt’s model politics requires a specific
place in the world, and the inhabitance of this place is, in certain circumstances (the
circumstance of the refugee for instance), beyond the control of the individual who inhabits, or
would inhabit—which means that the capacity for politics can be taken away. In Rancière’s
model the political subject has the capacity to act politically (to have significant opinions and act
effectively) regardless of their status of habitation (having a place in the world or not)—the
capacity for politics cannot be taken away. Even if his subject did not, in Arendt’s terminology,
have a place in the world, this would not preclude it from the possibility of claiming a place in
the world. Arendt speaks of the world in the singular, thus an individual can be expelled from it,
it can be lost. For Rancière the world is always divided and doubled, thus it can never be fully
lost, there is no full expulsion. A political subject can always claim a place in the world because
they can stage a dissensus, in which they put two worlds in one— demonstrating the existence
of, not just the world in which they have no place, but another world, in which they do have
place.
Rancière draws attention to the strong conception of belonging at play in Arendt’s
politics. She conceives of subjects as belonging to one or another sphere of human life—public
or private— and is able to conceive of a space beyond humanity, altogether outside the realms of
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public and private, to which a definite human subject corresponds, because this subject, the
rightless person, belongs to this space from out of its very un-belonging to every other spheres of
human life. The plight of the rightless, in Arendt’s analysis, is identical with their loss of
belonging; as Arendt writes, the right at stake in the plight of the refugee becomes apparent
“when belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not
belonging no longer a matter of choice138”. But the rightless subject, Rancière contests, does not
exist. No human is definitely rightless or belongs to a sphere of rightlessness beyond humanity
because, regardless of real inequalities and lack of rights, every identity is divided, and anyone
can enact a dissensus, showing that their is not one given reality but two conflicting realities.
Stressing belonging as Arendt does, absolutizing it and instituting distinct spaces of belonging
and not belonging, creates ‘exceptions’ to the political and ‘exceptional’ spaces outside politics
and humanity. Thinking in terms of a definite belonging covers over the divisions and doublings
in human existence by which a political subject might demonstrate that, at the same time as they
don’t belong, they do belong. Ultimately this constitutes an erasure of the political. A frame in
which rights are dispensed by virtue of belonging dispenses with the political action of dispute,
making rights the definite predicates of a political subject, rather than the very subject of politics.
Rancière writes “freedom and equality [i.e. rights] are not predicates belonging to definite
subjects. Political predicates are open predicates, the open up a dispute about what they entail,
whom they concern and in which cases.”139 Arendt’s conception of belonging and definite
spheres of human activity creates an apolitical space, radically outside of politics and humanity.
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The disjunction between Arendt’s and Rancière’s account of rights manifests itself, from
another perspective, in Arendt’s attention to the distinction between the rights of men and the
rights of citizens. Arendt still tries to name a right that properly belongs to the human. She writes
that “no one seemed to know which rights [the rightless] lost when they lost these human
rights,”140 and elaborates that certain rights, the right to life, to freedom, to the pursuit of
happiness, cannot be thought of as human rights, for in wartime the soldier loses the right to life,
in times of emergency the citizen loses the right to the pursuit of happiness, and the prisoner
always loses the right to freedom, but “nobody would ever claim that in any of these instances a
loss of human rights had taken place.”141 One of Arendt’s major questions in “The Perplexities”
is: what is a human right, what can properly be named a human right? This is an unnecessary
question for Rancière because rights, as such, are of man. There is not a particular right that
belongs to man because the inscription of rights, and their enactment, exceeds the particular
naming of a right. In the 1980’s, with the rise in social groups claiming additional rights, there
were debates, in France and elsewhere, as to whether “the rise of new rights might not signal a
perversion of the principle of human rights,” new rights applying to social and economic and
cultural (private) affairs.142 For Rancière human rights are the capacity of humans to claim and
enact rights—that we continually make new rights rather than remain tied to a preordained,
prejudged set of human rights is the point and principle of human rights. There is no corruption
of the principles of human rights, for human rights are not defined and situated in some original
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context—they are created as they are redeclared. The declaration of human rights is more
momentous than the specific right declared.

!
The Second Part of “The Perplexities” and the Right to Have Rights
But the disagreements that Rancière manifests between his and Arendt’s account of rights
and politics is less fundamental than he presents it to be, precisely because the shortcomings he
identifies in Arendt are the subject of the second part of “The Perplexities” which he does not
comment on. In this part, Arendt addresses and resists what she has calls the plight of the
rightless and the impotence of the Rights of Man. Even if the Right of Man can be understood to
function as Rancière theorizes, the facts of the refugee crisis in the beginning of the twentieth
century that Arendt establishes maintain that, although less helpless and not essentially
dehumanized, the refugees found little respite or sanctuary in the Rights of Man. These human
rights were of little use to the refugees. It is this experience, the emergence of millions of people
who had lost their status as citizens and had no reliable access to the Rights of Man, nor the
possibility of regaining their rights as citizens, that made Arendt “aware of the existence of” a
different and hitherto unformulated human right which she names, “a right to have rights (and
that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right
to belong to some kind of organized community.”143 Arendt doesn’t formulate the right to have
rights as a solvent to the condition of rightlessness, in her account the the right to have rights is a
more legitimate right than those documented by the Rights of Man, but the rightless have lost
this right as well. But, setting that aside, maintaining Rancière’s rejection of absolute
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rightlessness, the idea manifest in the right to have rights breaks with the account of human
rights that Rancière critiques. Although famously freighted with ambiguity, Arendt’s right to
have rights appears to resonate and foreshadow the account of rights that Rancière himself
gives.144 It is curious then, that Rancière makes no mention of the right to have rights, and seems
not to engage with this, if not the culmination of Arendt’s chapter, then one of its crescendos, and
a point toward which much of the material Rancière critiques is building.
The right to have rights, in its language as much as its ideas, and in spite of Arendt’s
parenthetic ‘explanation’ of it, has proven in equal parts fecund and frustrating. This is
inevitable, for Arendt never returned to this concept, nor obviously integrated it into her work. Of
her (in)famous concept, the banality of evil, she wrote “after having been struck by a fact, which,
willy nilly ‘put me in possession of a concept (the banality of evil), I could not help raising the
question quaestio iuris' and asking myself ‘with what right I possessed and used it’.”145 This
statement may just as well have been written of the right to have rights, if only for the fact that,
so far as it appears in writing, Arendt never asked herself “with what right [she] possessed and
used it”—leaving that question open to whosoever has attempted to make something of the right
to have rights..
There is a tendency among those who make use of the right to have rights, in scholarship
on Arendt and on human rights, to assimilate the phrase into the human rights paradigm—“to
treat the phrase as merely another, more poetic name for ‘human rights’,” or, “reduce the ‘right to
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have rights’ to a new-and-improved version of human rights.”146 The abstractness of the phrase,
the paradoxical quality of its repetition of ‘right’, make it a tempting template to translate into a
more manageable formulation; a right to asylum147;a right to enter148; to define a hierarchal
relation between the two rights149, or some other such structure that distinguishes clearly between
subject and object.
None of these formulations are unfounded, indeed the right to have rights demands
reformulation. The original model for doing this is the text of Origins itself, which names a
number of objects that the rightless had lost and formulates several other novel rights adjacent to
the formulation of the right to have rights. There is the loss of a home, the loss of the distinctive
social texture of one’s place in the world along with the place itself; the loss of government
protection and of legal status; and, effectively unifying these losses, there is the calamity that the
the rightless have lost their polity, they no longer belong to any community at all.150 But to take
the losses of this list, coupled with the right to have rights, as new objects for ‘human rights’ to
embrace and formulate rights around would be to misunderstand the effort of the text, and reduce
the right to have rights to the framework of the Rights of Man. Arendt’s critique of human rights
does not merely address the specific objects of right named by and in human rights discourse or
enumerated in La Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, though she surely does this.
Her critique addresses the more general frame and thinking that characterize human rights. When
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human rights first became a practical political issue, in the emergence of humans who humans
and nothing more,151 they did not fail because they simply named the wrong rights and
alternatively, if different rights had been named human rights would not have been any more
effective. As a guiding form and structure, human rights was impotent. It named the rights it did
and named no others because of what it already was, by reason of its theoretical conception and
assumptions. Thus, any mere expansion of the objets which human rights apply to would leave
untouched a set of bankrupt premises and assumptions.
The right to have rights names rights themselves as its object. It breaks with the rights of
man outlined in the first part of “The Perplexities”, and, doing this, approaches Rancière’s
affirmation of rights as such. The right to have rights exists in its fullest sense as a question— as
Frank Michelman says, its difficulty “fairly leaps off the page.”152 It guarantees rights on the
basis of a right, but, bereft of rights, of what good could such a right be? By making rights their
own source it responds to the perplexities of human rights as Alexander did to the Gordion knot,
cutting it in half—not so much solving the problem as approaching it in an entirely novel way.
The numerous and varied reformulations of the right to have rights bring it back to the traditional
paradigm of human rights, in a sense solving the right to have rights by reintegrating it into an
established system, but it is the basic problem manifest in the phrase, its novel approach to the
question of rights, which continues to make a claim on our thinking attention and represents the
phrase’s enduring significance. Undoubtably, there invitation to reformulation in the phrase, and
this is, perhaps, part of its genius, but by the same token, no reformulation is adequate to the
phrase— though each formulation deduced from the right to have rights may be meaningful,
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none exhaust or successfully define the phrase. As Alastair Hunt writes, “far from being a new
version of human rights, the right to have rights blows wide open the question of who the
subjects of politics are, and prompts us to rethink, from the ground up, the most just shape of a
democratic political community.”153 The best interpretation of the right to have rights may be one
that doesn’t entirely reconcile its novel approach to rights, the question at its heart, and, despite
reformulation, retains a space in which the questions can still be heard. Nanda Oudejans provides
such an example when she describes the refugee as not merely raising the question of how
inclusion into politics can occur, and furthermore, how one who is excluded can still be political,
but also, “[raising] fundamental questions as to the people’s self-inclusion and self-foundation”.
She writes, “the right to have rights radically calls into question the power of a people to
determine itself, and in the wake of that, challenges the concomitant claimed right to select and
exclude outsiders in its own interest.”154 This calling into question is an essential feature of the
right to have rights. Another such example is found in Frank Michelman’s Parsing a Right to
Have Rights, when, after attempting to follow the logic of the right to have rights, he concludes
that “reading [Arendt] as I believe she rather ought to be read leads back to the sort of
conundrum with which we began, which her text does not resolve”, and which he puts more
specifically later: “[Arendt] is pointing to an irreparable groundlessness of rights, affirming our
own precarious, existential, collective self-care when it comes to creating and maintaining in this
153 Alistair
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world the conditions of civility and humanity for any or for all.”155 In other words, if the
perplexities of the Rights of Man made them politically impotent, the strength of the right to
have rights is that it is an embodiment of the perplexities themselves, the perplexities inherent to
human rights. It continually reopens the problem they present, repeating and reminding that these
perplexities and the groundlessness of human rights, remain. Instead of being rendered invalid
like the Rights of Man did, “which had never been philosophically established but merely
formulated, which had never been politically secured but merely proclaimed,”156 the right to
have rights points to this very challenge, the absence of an enduring philosophically and
politically secured establishment, and subjects the questions of establishment, foundation, and
authority, the perplexities of human rights, to continued thought and attempted solutions.

!
Rightlessness and Holes of Oblivion
The emergence of millions of rightless refugees made Arendt aware of the existence of a
right to have rights, only as the last and most important right lost by the rightless, sealing them
into their rightlessness. Rancière’s critique of the theoretical framework that lead to Arendt’s
conceptualization of the rightlessness is significant because it calls into question what Arendt
believes the plight of the refugee to be, but it doesn’t undermine her discovery of the right to
have rights. This right emerged from her consideration of the refugees of World War One and
Two, but it is not tied to, nor does it depend on, the specific analysis Arendt makes of this
situation. As in Arendt’s treatment of the historical event and her approach to thinking, the right
to have rights doesn’t depend on a given set of premises, and her ideas do not topple when a
155
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premise is upset. Even in the language Arendt uses to describe the right to have rights, it is
something she becomes aware of, it is not tied to one or another proof—that is, in the absence of
a rightless subject, the right to have rights is not invalidated. Indeed, the pertinent shift would be
to realize that this right was never definitely lost. Thus, one may question the concept of
rightlessness without undoing the right to have rights. It stands alone as what she comes to call
“the one human right157”, and is connected to rightlessness as much as it is to other of Arendt’s
concepts and her broader conception of the modern world. Indeed, Arendt makes a significant
revision in a later text, Eichmann in Jerusalem, to what she described in Origins as “holes of
oblivion”, a revision which may be successfully extended to her concept of rightlessness.
In “Totalitarianism in Power,” the third chapter of “Totalitarianism,” the final section of
Origins, Arendt describes the way totalitarianism created, or attempted to create, what she calls,
“organized oblivion,” a total domination of man extending beyond the concentration camps to
society at large, effectively creating a, “concentration-camp society,” a, “society of the dying”
that consisted of, “living corpses.”158 The analogy of the subject of totalitarian domination to a
living corpse likens their life to the life of the dead, because, as encapsulated in the concept of
superfluousness, the subject of total domination losing both the public and private realm of
human life, like the dead, was made to not belong to the world. Because totalitarian domination
could be only fully test its most radical techniques in the concentration camp, the camp was the
most perfectly realized example of organized oblivion, of the society of the dying.159 For this
reason Arendt called the concentration camps “holes of oblivion,”160 places from which, as
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David Rousset writes, “there can be no testimony”, for, “no witnesses are left…there are
hundreds of thousands of us here, all living in absolute solitude”161. In the camps death itself was
made anonymous and robbed of its meaning, “making martyrdom, for the first time in history,
impossible.”162
The camp was a radically new experience in human history, and was itself an existential
state—Arendt writes that “the concentration camps are the laboratories where changes in human
nature are tested.”163 The conceptualization of the rightless is not only similar to that of the
subject of totalitarian domination, it bears a striking resemblance to Arendt’s depiction of the
concentration camp. To be sure they are not alike in content, but the form of Arendt description is
similar. Both the rightless and the camp are conceptualized as absolute existential states,
bordering on an ontological condition. As human nature is changed and recreated in the camp,
the refugee experiences a loss of, “some of the most essential characteristics of human life,” a
loss which can hardly be understood without, in some way, taking into account human nature. In
this respect, both the rightless and the camp appear as perfected conceptual categories. Rancière
objects to Arendt’s rightless person because, on the most basic level, he does not believe that
such a concept really exists in the world. Arendt’s revision of the concentration camp, as a hole
of oblivion, is made on similar grounds.
At the end of the chapter titled “Evidence and Witnesses,” in Eichmann in Jerusalem
Arendt quotes from the memoir of a German Army physician named Peter Bamm who holds the
same view of concentration camps and of totalitarian domination that she puts forth in Origins.
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He writes that totalitarian governments “don’t permit their opponents to die a great, dramatic
martyr’s death for their convictions…the totalitarian government lets its opponents disappear in
silent anonymity”, from which it follows that “anyone who had dared to suffer death rather than
silently tolerate the crime would have sacrificed his life in vain.”164 Such a sacrifice might retain
its moral dimension, but would nonetheless be “practically useless.”165 In anonymity, whatever
morality may be demonstrated by suffering death rather than tolerating totalitarianism’s crimes in
silence, would be known to no one, and thus be vain and useless. The hopelessness expressed by
this view is the horror Arendt evokes in Origins, but in this chapter, published twelve years after
the initial publication of Origins, Arendt rejects the hopeless view that sees even death as
practically useless. Reflecting on the story of Anton Schmidt, a German officer who helped Jews
during the war— supplying them with forged papers and transportation—and was executed by
the Nazis for his actions, Arendt writes, “the holes of oblivion do not exist. Nothing human is
that perfect, and there are simply too many people in the world to make oblivion possible. One
man will always be left alive to tell the story. Hence, nothing can ever be ‘practically
useless.’”166
Arendt is dealing with questions of memory and storytelling in this quote, among the
primary things totalitarianism seeks to obliterate in its aim to totally isolate, and thus totally
dominate its subjects. Total domination depended on the radical anonymity it forces upon its
subjects, the “absolute solitude” Rousset describes, in which every human exists as if they are
alone, without others, and thus are powerless. As power can only be created by people together,
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corresponds to the condition of human plurality, there is no potential for power in isolation.167
But here Arendt rejects the success of total domination she had theorized, as holes of oblivion, in
Origins.
Arendt gives two reasons for why the holes of oblivion do not exist. First, she writes,
“nothing human is that perfect,” and second because, “there are simply too many people in the
world to make oblivion possible”. These claims are interrelated. The second claim corresponds to
the condition of human plurality, “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the
world,”168 which accounts for the claim that there will always be someone left alive to tell others
what has happened.169 If this were not the case, if there really were holes of oblivion in which
human plurality was completely destroyed, in which people could disappear without a trace, then
human life as we know it would have ceased to exist. The fact of plurality also contains in it the
first rejection, for plurality rules out the existence of anything perfect in human affairs. Human
affairs are worldly, and the world is rife with contradiction and change. Perfection can only be
achieved by retreating from the world into the self—as in the case of the “a closed, integrated,
organically gown and cultivated individual” who ignores the fact of plurality and “looks around
to see where in the world the most favorable place for his development might be, in order to
bring himself into harmony with the world by detour of thought.”170 But this activity,
disappearing into the self, strives for a perfection that is neither human nor of the world.
In Arendt’s rejection of the holes of oblivion, her championing of plurality and the
absence of perfection in human and worldly affairs, she also rejects the notion of a political
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thinking that arrives at perfection, or perfected concepts. Only a thinking that departs from the
world can arrive at an idea so sealed and absolute as the total anonymity and total domination of
the holes of oblivion. It may be observed that rightlessness and the rightless person is another
such perfect concept. The rightless, having lost some of the most essential features of human life
and been expelled from humanity, are without, “the very qualities which make it possible for
other people to treat him as a fellow man.”171 By virtue of their deprivation they cannot even be
recognized as human. A concept which subjects millions of people to this status is no less
absolute and overdetermined than the concept of holes of oblivion, and also flies in the face of
the statement that, “nothing human is that perfect.”
Arendt once quoted a remark of Kant’s, in which he said, “it is by no means unusual upon
comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject,…to find that we
understand him better than he had understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his
concept, he has something [sic] spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intentions”,
and wrote herself that, “this remark is of course applicable to his own work.172” In this case we
apply the remark to her work. Unbound to the specific conceptualization of rightlessness, the
proximity between Arendt and Rancière appears fully. In Arendt’s statement against human
perfection, Rancière’s rejection of a ‘pure politics’ can be heard. Both thinkers are concretely
concerned with refuting, or circumventing the idea that establishes a space beyond the possibility
of politics. Where Arendt seems to theorize this space, rightlessness, only to provide a resource
to contest it, Rancière constructs his entire theory of politics against this possibility, as a theory
of including the excluded. It might be said of Arendt that, in the formulation of the right to have
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rights, she is attempting to prove that rights are political, specifically because she observes a
political situation in which rights seem not apply. Conversely one might say of Rancière’s
project, that it intends to demonstrate that the political is rights. In reference to this distinction,
the right to have rights can be seen as a radical break in Arendt’s work, and a bridge between
her’s and Rancière’s though, as it points towards the possibility of politicizing that which appears
to be apolitical, that, as Bonnie Honig puts it, “nothing is necessarily or naturally or ontologically
not political.”173 This is the activity Rancière describes as the putting of two worlds in one and
the same world—it is the activity of expanding the political. The right to have rights provides a
resource for this expansion.174
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Chapter III
Chapter two began with the speech Arendt gave upon receiving the Lessing prize, in
which she praised Lessing’s practice of thinking, selbstdenken, for preserving a link between
action and thought—“both action and though occur in the form of movement”175. This
connection between thinking and movement is important in Arendt’s own thinking writing, and
on the basis of this insight we were able to rethink Rancière's critique of Arendt. We saw that
thinking, as a form of movement, is an activity that does not arrive at answers but is terminated
by them, that “every truth that is a result of a thought process necessarily puts an end to the
movement of thinking”176. This insight, of the priority Arendt gives to movement in political
thought, can help radicalize her work. Yet, it is a mistaken to overstate the importance of this
conception of thinking, or to use it in order to create a primarily negative or destructive
interpretation of her work that eschews answers and conclusions. Arendt creates concepts and
theoretical structure that, often arriving at answers, in what Judith Butler has described as her
“outrageously authoritative tone” of “bold declaratives, authoritative prose,”177 that shouldn’t be
simply revised or written off. Neither the intent to stimulate thought and practice independent
thinking are incongruent with the task of argument and construction, of announcing full ideas.
Thus a concept like the right to have rights is only partially treated when, as in the preceding
chapter, it is primarily defined in its negative and critical dimension. It has an entirely other
dimension that is worthy of treatment. The right to have rights and the idea of a human right is
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central to an overarching argument Arendt makes in Origins, attempting to respond to what she
calls “the burden of out times,”178 the same burden to which totalitarianism responds.

!
Concluding Remarks: Totalitarianism and the Burden of Our Time
The original publication of Origins begins and ends—in its “Preface” and “Concluding
Remarks”—with an invocation of the need for a “new law on earth”. Subsequent editions of
Origins excised “Concluding Remarks,” replacing it with an additional chapter on
totalitarianism. Arendt clearly states this change wasn’t made because she no longer agreed with
the argument of “Concluding Remarks”—she wrote of this, “suggestive but consciously
inconclusive,” section, “it may be argued that the very inconclusiveness of the original ending,
showing the extent to which the author was involved and prepared to remain engaged in her
subject matter, was better attuned to the mood and style of the whole book.”179 Ideology and
Terror: A Novel Form of Government, which replaced Concluding Remarks, is more rigorously
theoretical and punctuates Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism. By contrast, Concluding Remarks
returns to the question of human rights and shows how her conception of a human right, the right
to have rights, is deeply bound up with other questions in her work, namely that of the radical
break the modern world, which “was born with the first atomic explosions,”180 has made with the
past, and the problems entailed in this break.
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The first half of Concluding Remarks addresses the question of totalitarianism, and “the
disturbing relevance of totalitarian regimes.”181 Arendt speaks of totalitarianism, partisanship for
the world, in terms of relevance—a relevance to the modern world, because regardless of its
longevity (Arendt believed it likely that totalitarianism would disappear), it is a form of
government that cannot be separated from the crisis of the twentieth century. As puts it,
totalitarianism became, “this century’s curse only because it so terrifyingly took care of its
problems.”182 The problems of this century, addressed in brutal and unthinkable ways by
totalitarianism, remain with us, thus making totalitarianism relevant, not simply in its own right,
but in relation to the challenge that must still be faced.183 Totalitarianism’s true significance is
that its aims and extreme methods revealed, for the first time, the fundamental and intractable
problems of this century. This half of Concluding Remarks can largely be found in, and as the
impetus for, the chapter that came to replace it, Ideology and Terror, which makes a deeper
analysis of totalitarianism’s aims and means.
The second half of Concluding Remarks (the chapter is divided in half by a single space)
deals with the problems of the modern world. Above all, the problem is that “the whole structure
of Western culture with all its implied beliefs, traditions, standards of judgement, has come
toppling down over our heads,”184 and the burden of our time is to rise to the challenge of this
collapse. Arendt enumerates four characteristics, or distinct problems, implicated in the collapse,
and revealed in the practices of totalitarian domination.185 Totalitarianism made a claim to global

181 Arendt,

“Origins,” 619,
“Origins,” 619,
183 Arendt, “Origins,” 619,
184 Arendt, “Origins,” 625,
185 Arendt, “Origins,” 625,
182 Arendt,

!70
rule, spread the notion that ‘everything is possible’, attempted to change the nature of man, and
was contemptuous of factuality.186 These are totalitarianism’s “solutions” to the problems of our
time, made apparent in totalitarianism’s attempt to ‘solve’ them. Corresponding to
totalitarianism’s claim to global rule is the fact that, “mankind is no longer a beautiful dream of
unity or a dreadful nightmare of strangeness, but a hard inescapable reality”; corresponding to its
notion that ‘everything is possible’ is the, “knowledge that far more is possible that we had ever
thought”; corresponding to the totalitarian attempt to change the nature of man is the, “insight
that no nature, not even the nature of man, can any longer be considered to be the measure of all
things”; and corresponding to totalitarianism’s contempt for factuality is, “modern man’s deeprooted suspicion for everything he did not make himself.”187 Together, the novel result of these
four problems is that, “though we have many traditions and know them more intimately than any
generation before us, we can fall back upon none, and that, though we are saturated with
experience and more competent at interpreting it than any century before, we cannot use any of
it.”188 The premise of Arendt’s thinking is that, although totalitarianism is a supreme calamity, it
did not create our burden, the collapse of tradition and civilization. Indeed, it faced this burden
before the rest of the world did, and by responding to it in a ruthless and extremely destructive
manner, has forced us to face the burden too—the collapse of all our traditions and the rejection
of everything given.189 Tradition was among our givens, a with its collapse, other of our givens,
the world, natural laws, human nature, and even human existence, are no longer trusted.
“Modern man has come to resent everything given, even his own existence…in his resentment of
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all laws merely given to him, he proclaims openly that everything is permitted and believes
secretly that everything is possible.”190 Arendt sees this attitude of fundamental resentment
proliferated among the people of the modern world—it is this attitude, even more than the
collapse of tradition, which poses a threat, for she finds this resentment of everything given
characteristic of the masses without which totalitarianism could not have risen.191 The burden of
our time is not merely that traditions have been broken, but that masses of people are so
thoroughly resentful of the world as to make the present a fertile ground for the development of
the radical solutions embodied by totalitarian domination.

!
The Emancipation from History and Nature
This crisis is the result of a long process of deterioration which Arendt describes as man’s
gradual emancipation from his transcendent sources of law and the authority of law—history and
nature. History and nature functioned as origins, which, transcending man and human history,
gave meaning to both and appeared secure from the haphazardness of human action accident.192
Arendt likens both to myths, and sees examples of such a historical origin in in various theories
of history: “the Greek assumption of a Golden Age”; the “Oriental hypotheses that an absolute
evil was the source of things human”; the “Hebrew myth of a lost Paradise [to] be rediscovered
in the Messianic Age”; “the Christian myth that original sin needed the entire course of history as
its necessary road to salvation”193. Common to each of these theories is the belief that,
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“something was there, given, already established before human history actually began.”194 Such
origins gave a source of law and of authority beyond human control, an authority to be obeyed or
disobeyed to be sure, but given nonetheless, not subject to change.195
Man’s emancipation from history occurred in the American and French revolutions,
which, without proposing a new concept of history, they still relied on the enlightenment’s theory
of progress, proposed a new concept of its ultimate meaning.196 History had been mankind’s
education, and they declared that man had now come of age. The revolutionaries declared the
concept of human rights, rights that were given with human nature as such, independent of an
emancipated from historical rights,197 thus declaring man’s independence from a transcendent
origins in history.198 But this declaration was not the emancipation of man into utter
independence, for it substituted nature for history, replacing historical rights with natural rights
in the tacit assumption that nature had a more essential relationship to the human than history.199
In the modern age, in which man has produced weapons capable of destroying the earth and
achieved a level of scientific knowledge that renders the existence of natural laws doubtful, man
has came into utter independence, equally emancipated from nature and history.200 Today, no
nature, not even the nature of man, can any longer be considered to be the measure of all things
—there are no longer any transcendental sources of law and authority.
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The absence of a transcendental source of law and authority has created modern man’s
resentment and distrust for everything merely given, but this does not mean that there are no
more givens, or that we are fundamentally deprived of law and the authority of law. The
challenge we must face, the burden of our times, is to “create—not merely discover” new laws as
well as their very measure, “the principle of their source.”201 Arendt sees in the coeval emergence
of mankind as a factual reality “no longer separated by space and nature, and consequently, by
spiritually insurmountable walls of history and culture”, with the emancipation of man from
nature and history, a situation in which “mankind actually begins to occupy the position formerly
assigned to nature or history.”202 In the existence of mankind new source of authority may be
fashioned. But this does not mean that a new source of authority and law is given in mankind’s
reality. Totalitarianism attests to the ambivalence of this new reality, in which mankind has taken
the place of history and nature. The factual existence of mankind created the possibility for
totalitarianism’s claim to world domination as much as it may create the possibility for a new
source of authority. The great danger and great responsibility of the modern crisis is that
anything can come of it. In man’s emancipation from the absolute authorities of old, nothing is
given other than a new burden of responsibility for what is to come next. The radical destruction
of totalitarianism is as likely as the creation of a new source of authority. As Arendt puts it,
“mankind will either find a way to live in and rule together an overcrowded earth or it will
perish.”203 The modern world is, “a new and yet unknown age.”204
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A New Law on Earth
Establishing a new law on earth means nothing short of making new laws and, before
that, creating the authority that must be the source of these laws. The task is at once a dire
necessity and a radical opportunity, a necessary response to the threat manifested by
totalitarianism as well and the novel possibility of man himself giving a meaning to his history
and all of his activities. The establishment of a new law on earth is only needed because of the
disintegration of every law given by Western civilization, and only conceivable because nothing
short of the real existence of mankind could suffice to create a new source of the authority of
law. In this sense, the crisis of the collapse of civilization is “not the end of history, but its first
consciously planned beginning.”205 Only in the absence of any given laws can man himself
create a new one. Human rights had been based on the assumption of nature’s absolute authority,
and with the invalidation of nature authority, human rights were also invalidated; in the new
reality, in a time when, if there is to be a new source of authority man must make it himself,
human rights can be revived and made the basis of a new law.

One Human Right
The right to have rights appears twice in Origins. In the first instance Arendt writes, “we
became aware of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is
judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized
community”;206 in the second instance she writes, “the new situation, in which ‘humanity’ has in
effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this context that the
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right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed
by humanity itself.”207 In both iterations it is accompanied by another right: first an additional
right, an ‘and’, and then translated, by an ‘or’, into another right. The two others rights are rights
to belong—“a right to belong to some kind of organized community” and “the right of every
individual to belong to humanity.” In the space between the first and second enunciation the right
itself, as a right to belong, does not radically change, although its object, the object of belonging,
does change—humanity replaces an organized community. An organized community is a space
for politics in so far as it creates a space in which speech and action are meaningful. In the rapid
substitution of humanity for an organized community, the organized community appears to be
subsumed by, or included in, humanity. At the same time as this replacement occurs, what are
initially presented as two rights, the right to have rights and the right to belong, becomes a single
right—a right to have rights or a right to belong. This singularity is already alluded to in the first
appearance of the right to have rights when Arendt describes “what we must call a ‘human
right’…a general characteristic of the human condition.”208 She is thinking in terms of a human
right—which she makes explicit in the “Concluding Remarks,” writing, “man as man has only
one right that transcends his various rights as a citizen”, and “corresponding to the one crime
against humanity is the one human right”209. In the declaration of a single human right, a unity
appears between the right to have rights and the right to belong.
The idea of belonging does not only appear in the formulation of a right—it recurs in
Origins, and is almost abundant in “The Perplexities.” Arendt speaks of the novel tragedy visited
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upon the rightless in terms of belonging. She writes, “something much more fundamental than
freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community
into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter of
choice”210; and, “the calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion—formulas which
were designed to solve problems within given communities—but that they no longer belong to
any community whatsoever.”211 In the “Totalitarianism” section of Origins Arendt writes of
superfluousness and loneliness in terms of belonging: they are “the experience of not belonging
to the world at all, which is among the most radical and desperate experiences of man.”212
Belonging is one of the fundamental human experiences imperiled by the modern crisis, thus it is
also central in Arendt’s response to the crisis. In speaking of a right to belong one does no more
than parrot Arendt. But the fact that the right to belong is equated to, and perhaps even
undergirds, the right to have rights makes it evident that, when Arendt writes of one human right,
she is writing of the right to belong.

!
Belonging
This idea of belonging must be separated from the idea of belonging critiqued by
Rancière. That belonging is modeled on Burke’s concept of inheritance in which the relations of
property are extended to the concept of rights. Arendt does not accept that vision of rights, it is
among the flaws of the rights of man and is in part responsible for the emergence of the rightless.
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The idea of belonging referred to here is distinguished from that which identifies particular
individuals with definite identities and furthers what Rancière calls the process of consensus and
depoliticization. Belonging, in its new sense, is productive of, and even a precondition for,
politics.
As we’ve seen in the shift from a right to belong to an organized community to a right to
belong to humanity, belonging is not an autonomous concept that holds its own worth for Arendt.
Its worth stems, to a significant degree, from its object, that to which it relates. In a 1964
interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt speaks of two kinds of belonging; one is a naturally
occurring condition, “you belong to some sort of group when you are born, always”; the second
belonging is political, it is the belonging that occurs in forming or joining some group or
organization which “has to do with a relation to the world” (here she defines the world as “space
for politics”), based on what the “people who become organized have in common…interests”213.
This distinction is made over a decade after the publication of Origins, in which both senses of
belonging seem to be entwined. Belonging is related to an organized community—which is
understood as a space for politics—and also to humanity, which expands beyond the designation
of an organized community, of the realm of politics, to the private realm of human life as well.
Arendt’s human right responds to the plight of the rightless and the crimes of totalitarian
domination, which not content with isolating individuals, eradicating the space for politics which
they share with others, “destroys private life as well.”214 To not belong to the world, to be
superfluous, does not mean to be merely isolated from others—expelled from politics—but to be
made lonely, forced from the private realm as well. Loneliness follows upon isolation if the
213
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isolated person is no longer recognized as a human and treated as a mere animal.215 In Arendt’s
concept of rightlessness, the rightless, who have lost those qualities which make them
recognizable and ensure their treatment as humans, are indeed subjected to such a condition.216
Thus, the right to belong to humanity encompasses both the public and private realms of human
life.
Belonging to humanity is not given. This is the tragic insight brought to light by the
appearance of the rightless, and revealed to Arendt that what had hitherto been thought of as an
immutable characteristic of the human condition was actually a human right—the right to have
rights or the right to belong. Much as the burden of our time was brought to light by the
outrageous actions of totalitarianism, this human right becomes apparent only when it is
perceived to be lost, in the appearance of the rightless.217 A right, a human right even, is neither
transcendent nor absolute, because of the simple fact that it can be take away. The rightless
signal the possibility of not belonging to humanity, both a political and a private loss. The
rightless are not relegated to the private realm, they are pushed from the space of both the private
and public realm. This is the expulsion from humanity, an expulsion that, unlike the loss of a
home, of government protection, or of access to the realm of politics, is unheard of “in the long
memory of history.”
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Rightlessness
As we’ve attempted to demonstrate, the concept of rightlessness is an untenable one,
more of a conceptual category than of the world. From this position, the right to have rights or
the right to belong is no less essential, but is not considered as a right that was definitely lost. As
a general human characteristic or capacity it may be removed but not erased, taken but not lost.
Following Rancière’s argument, an individual can be deprived of their human rights, but because
these rights cannot be absolutely erased, because there is still an awareness of them, they can be
taken back. It is in this sense that we don’t agree with Arendt’s concept of rightlessness; but
because rightlessness was essential to Arendt’s awareness of this human right, in what follows
we return to and explore the concept, without affirming it.
The defining and truly damning plight of the rightless is that, not only had they lost their
human rights, been expelled from humanity, but, as Arendt writes, they, “could not regain these
rights.”218 There are, of course, examples in which human rights were restored to the rightless.
But, as in the example of the state of Israel, or the nationality based reintegration programs (in
the case of Mexico’s acceptance of some Spanish refugees, or the national quota system
instituted by the United States)219, human rights were only every restored by way of the
restoration of national rights, the rights of citizenship.220 The restoration of national rights is
achieved based on the decision of a sovereign national or international body, a decision over
which the refugee “has little, if any, influence.”221 The plight of the rightless is not that they are
beyond the potential possibility of regaining rights, but that, while retaining the potential, the
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possibility itself has nothing to do with them. The rightless may be given rights again, but this
will be a gift, over which they hold no sway—a gift given to apolitical humans, humans who
have lost the capacity to act.
It is the loss of the right to action and to meaningful speech that determines rightlessness.
Without these capacities the rightless do not have the capacity to regain their rights, to intervene
in political decisions, such as the decision over the restoration of national rights. They are the
defining characteristics of man insofar as he has the capacity to act politically.222 Without such
capacities whatever is visited upon the rightless, injustice and privilege alike, has nothing to do
with what they have done. “Innocence, in the sense of complete lack of responsibility, was the
mark of their rightlessness.”223 The rightless experience a loss of agency, and thus a loss of
responsibility over their fate and their future. Nanda Oudejans describes this as, “the
powerlessness which the refugee experiences,” insofar as, “refugees and democracies cannot
jointly decide on the refugee’s admission. As the very decision on his inclusion or exclusion is
always taken from within the polity, the refugee is virtually powerless with respect to his own
inclusion.”224 Oudejans calls this the, “inevitable asymmetry between refugees and receiving
states,” the fact that the rightless are helpless and the state powerful regarding the restoration of
human rights. In the powerlessness of the rightless, which is the condition of their innocence,
“blessings and doom are meted out to them according to accident and without any relation
whatsoever to what they do, did, or may do.”225 Arendt speaks of the rightless person’s
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experience of events in these theological terms, for, there powerlessness and inability to act, the
actions and decisions of sovereign power appear as absolute judgments, saving or dooming the
rightless person. Though the rightless may speak and have opinions, Arendt calls this, “a fool’s
freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow”;226 no one is obliged to listen to them, whatever
they may do lacks the condition of political action, being meaningful or significant, attended to
by others.
Though human rights can be restored to the rightless through reintegration into the
nation-state system, and though the potential to be reintegrated never disappears, reintegration is
dependent on the charity of others and accidents of circumstance. The inability to act or speak in
a meaningful way, one which will effect others and bestow responsibility and agency upon the
speaker, marks the rightless. Without losing the potential to regain humanity, the rightless have
lost the possibility to do it themselves and are at the mercy of others.227 It is in this sense that we
speak of a right to belong to humanity, a right which takes on both the political and natural
aspects of belonging delineated in the Gaus interview. As Arendt writes in We Refugees, “we lost
our homes, which means the familiarity of daly life. We lost our occupations, which means the
confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which means the
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naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings”228. In
the loss of humanity, the loss of the public and the private coincide.229 There is the loss of a
publicly recognized place in the world and also a loss of the “naturalness of reactions, the
simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings,” a private loss of the way in which
one claims and inhabits a place in the world.

!
Humanity and Humanitas
In the same 1964 interview, Günter Gaus quotes from a 1958 speech Arendt gave in
praise of Karl Jaspers, subsequently published as “Karl Jaspers: A Laudatio” in Men in Dark
Times. He quotes, “humanity [humanität] is never acquired in solitude, and never by giving one’s
work to the public. It can be achieved only by one who has thrown his life and his person into the
‘venture into the public realm’”230. Gaus is asking after what Arendt means by the phrase a
‘venture into the public realm’—a quote she borrows from Jaspers—but what she says about
humanity in her response, as well as in the Laudatio itself, reveals a more particular meaning the
word has for her, a double register in which she invokes it. At times Arendt uses ‘humanity’ as a
synonym for ‘mankind’, but elsewhere, as in the interview and the laudatio, and on occasion in
Origins, it is a concept all its own.
In the quote above Arendt states that humanity is not simply given with being human,
which was already made apparent in the work of Origins. What is new, however, and what
228

Kohn, Jerome, and Ron H. Feldman, editors. “We Refugees.” The Jewish Writings, by Hannah Arendt,
(Schocken Books, 2007), p264
229 The unification of both public and private in the idea of humanity, and the designation of belonging to humanity
as a right, a subject of political dispute, is evocative of Rancière’s process of subjectivization, in which an individual
acts politically by manifesting two different identities, designating different belonging, in the same place, and in this,
insisting on a revision on the identification or belonging.
230 Arendt, “Portable,” 21.

!83
perhaps sets this idea of humanity apart from one that is synonymous with mankind, is that
humanity is acquired or achieved—done so through the venture into the public realm. Arendt
explains this venture as “exposing oneself to the light of the public, as a person.”231 The
specificity of exposure as a person refers back to a distinction Arendt establishes in the Laudatio,
between, “one’s work,” and, “oneself”, or between, “the individual and the person.”232 The
individual may produce something and give it away to the the public realm, without necessarily
making a venture into the public, but if the work itself cannot be separated from the life of the
individual, if it a result “of ‘having proved oneself in life,’” then the person appears in public
alongside the work;233 what emerges from this latter phenomenon, “is unknown to the one who
reveals it; he cannot control it…the personal element is beyond the control of the subject.”234
This personal element only appears in public because it is only apparent to others, can only be
revealed where a public space exists. The venture into the public realm is the exposure of the
personal element to the light of the public. Because the person who so exposes themself does not
know what will be seen, the distinguishing quality of the venture, the exposure, is that it is
unpredictable. Arendt likens the personal element to “the Greek daimon…which accompanies
every man throughout his life, but is always only looking over his shoulder, with the result that it
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is more easily recognized by everyone a man meets than by himself.”235 The personal element or
personality of the human is hidden when it is not exposed before others (it is behind their back,
looking over their shoulder).
The personality is revealed in political action, but this does not mean that the personality
is merely an element of politics. The manifestation of the personality in public leads Arendt to
say that what she calls the public realm has a “deeper significance…which extends far beyond
what we ordinarily mean by political life.”236 To the extent that the public realm is also the space
where the personality of human beings to appear to others, “there is manifest in it what the
Romans called humanitas.”237
Arendt uses the word Humanitas as synonymously with the word Humanität or humanity
—she writes that, “humanitas is precisely what Kant and Jaspers mean by Humanität,”238 and in
the 1964 interview, Gaus, quoting the “Laudatio” replaces the word humanitas with Humanität
without drawing comment from Arendt.
The idea of Humanitas, or humanity, is conceived spatially239—it names a space in which
humans can fully reveal themselves. This space, humanity, is not given, “it can be achieved only
by one who has thrown his life and his person into the ‘venture into the public realm.’”
Humanity, the space in which the human can fully reveal himself, is achieved by making the
venture into the public realm, which we’ve already seen is the act of revealing or exposure. The
act of revealing then is coeval with the creation of the space in which one can reveal oneself. In
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this sense the venture into the public realm is creative—it reveals something at the same time as
creating the space in which such a revealing can take place. Arendt writes, “the ‘venture into the
public realm’, in which humanitas is acquired, becomes a gift to mankind”240. In its creative
aspect, the venture can be seen as a gift, for in achieving the space of humanity, the space is
opened up to others—the achievement of humanity is not an individual achievement, humanitas
is never acquired in solitude. The gift is also manifest in the risk one undertakes in the venture,
revealing something which is unknown and, for that reason, cannot be controlled. The
achievement of humanity establishes a relation between the individual and mankind, as in the
giving of a gift. Karl Jaspers is an example of this, one who, in achieving humanity, represented
its continued existence to others, even in the domination of totalitarianism which threatened to
erase the space of humanity.241
Arendt calls the common, shared space between people, the space of politics or the
world, but the space of humanity, as distinct from the space of politics, is the space between the
individual and mankind, a space through which the individual can relate to mankind. As Arendt
writes, “whatever stands up to light and does not dissolve in vapors under its brightness, partakes
of humanitas; to take it upon oneself to answer before mankind for every thought means to live
in that luminosity in which oneself and everything on thinks is tested”242. Arendt discusses
humanitas in her Laudatio for Karl Jaspers because he is at home the realm of humanitas, one
who has “written as if to answer for himself before all of mankind”, and one for whom this
“responsibility is not a burden.”243
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This idea of humanity is more rarified, a higher idea, than that expressed in Origins,
contained in the right to belong to humanity. Karl Jaspers demonstrates the achievement of
humanity, but he is an exceptional figure, “more at home in this region…than others who may be
acquainted with it.”244 Nonetheless, several features of humanity, as found in the “Laudatio,”
resonate with the humanity of the right to belong. In “Concluding Remarks” Arendt writes that,
as a result of the inescapable reality of mankind, which now exists as a single political reality,
“some of the factual responsibility shared by members of every national community for all the
deeds and misdeeds committed in their name has now expanded to the sphere of international
life.”245 This responsibility is articulated again the description of the relation of the individual to
mankind in the space of humanitas. To be in this space is to be responsible to mankind, to answer
for ones thoughts and actions before mankind, and not merely one’s national community. The
new responsibility that comes into being with the political reality of mankind is faced in Arendt’s
conception of humanity in the “Laudatio.”

!
The Authority of Politics and Rights
Arendt reformulates the one human right several times in Origins, naming it “a right to
the human condition itself”246, “the right of man to citizenship”247, “the right never to be
excluded from the rights granted by [one’s] community”248, as well as a right to have rights and a
right to belong to humanity. What these other names make more apparent, what each name
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shares, is a common commitment to a political, rather than absolute, conception of rights. This
corresponds to Arendt’s insistence that, “the only given condition for the establishment of rights
is the plurality of men.”249 Human plurality is also the condition for man’s political life. What is
given, the plurality of men, is no transcendent origin; unlike history and nature, it is a fact. On its
own the fact means nothing, it must be used in the creation of something, made to mean
something, like a human right. Arendt writes that a human right, “will, by itself, achieve neither
liberty nor justice, for these are the concern of the daily strife of all citizens; it can only secure
the participation of all men in the daily strife.”250 The participation of men in politics can only be
secured by a right, but the right which would secure this participation can itself only be secured
through the participation of men, that is through political activity. The condition for politics and
the condition for the establishment of rights is the same, human plurality. This is the
groundlessness invoked by Frank Michelman—that human rights must be made by humans on
their own behalf. While making them groundless, lacking in an absolute source of authority, they
also become politicized. Rights secure politics and politics secures rights. Their groundlessness
is the fact that they are grounded in themselves.
It must be said explicitly that the creation of human rights, or the possibility of a human
right, is the direct result of the existence of mankind. But even with the frame in which a human
right is conceivable, the authority by which a new law on earth might be established, which
might ground a human right, is absent. This, the question of the foundation of authority, is the
most pressing. There is no absolute authority that can sustain law or a human right, thus the only
possible source of authority remaining is that which men can create for themselves. All that
249 Arendt,
250 Arendt,
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stands is man’s capacity for politics and his ability to create something new. The plurality of
men, the condition for politics and for the establishment of rights, is also the condition for the
establishment of a new source of authority. As Arendt writes, “before drawing up the constitution
of a new body politic, we shall have to create—not merely discover—a new foundation for
human community as such.”251 The only possible source of authority, following the rejection of
‘history’ and ‘nature’, is man’s own capacity for politics.252
There is a logic in the “Concluding Remarks”: the existence of mankind is the
precondition for the foundation of a new law on earth. Only a new law on earth can establish the
existence of a human right which would guarantee the elementary right to belong to humanity.
But the authority on which a human right and a new law on earth depend must be created by the
actions of men. Arendt specifically rejects the idea to establish a “world government”253 that
would provide the authority for law and right.254 Once again distancing herself from Burke, she
writes that, “we must therefore try for what Burke’s great common sense deemed impossible:
‘new discoveries…in morality…or in the ideas of liberty’”255. These new discoveries would
follow from the acts of men attempting to produce a new authority. Arendt describes this
authority in incredible terms, “the prepolitical foundation of a new polity, the prelegal basis of a
new legal structure, the prehistorical fundament from which the history of mankind will derive
251 Arendt,
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its essential meaning in much the same way Western civilization did from its own fundamental
origin myths”256. Even though she conceives of an authority derived from man’s creative,
political capacity to act, it remains mythic—an origin from which law and right follows, rather
than emerging contemporaneously with it (as Rancière’s model allows for).257

!
Solidarity
In the final paragraphs of “Concluding Remarks” Arendt writes of something else,
something “in the meantime”, less awesome than the establishment of a new law on earth.258 She
writes of solidarity, and in the attempt to understand the origin of our modern problems, of, “a
way towards a new form of universal solidarity.”259 This solidarity is important, the thought on
which she concludes these inconclusive remarks, because those, “who were expelled from
humanity and from human history and thereby deprived of their human condition need the
solidarity of all men to assure them of their rightful place in ‘man’s enduring chronicle.”260 Not
so radical as the conscious beginning of history, it is something more tangible to work towards.
Not the guarantee of belonging to humanity by a new law or right, but the assurance of humanity
to those who have lost it.261
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In her interview with Günter Gaus, Arendt speaks of this solidarity when she says: “and
now I would say that this venture [into the public realm] is only possible when there is a trust
[trauen] in people. A trust—which is difficult to formulate but fundamental—in what is human
in all people [menschliche in aller menschen]. Otherwise such a venture could not be made.262”
Arendt invokes this trust in her “Laudatio” of Jaspers. She says that, existing in the realm of
humanitas as he does, Jaspers has a, “secret trust in man, in the humanitas of the human race.”263
The trust, or solidarity, is formulated in Concluding Remarks as an attitude, a, “fundamental
gratitude for the few elementary things that indeed are invariably given us, such as life itself, the
existence of man and the world…gratitude emphasizes that we are not alone in the world.”264
Gratitude for our elementary givens is not enough to establish authority, to guarantee law and
right, but it recognizes the plurality of men and that men can create—“that man was created with
the power of procreation, that not a single man but Men inhabit the earth.”265 If gratitude, as the
recognition of human plurality, can be understood as the condition for the venture into the public
realm, a political act as well as an act of exposure, one that creates the space in which humans
may bear the responsibility of the existence of mankind, it seems to be an essential condition for
men to establish rights and create a new source of authority for themselves. In the nexus
connecting gratitude, rights, plurality, authority, and politics, gratitude, as the recognition of
plurality, appears at the center, for plurality, as we’ve seen, is the condition upon which rights,
politics, and authority depend.
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Conclusion
Chapter III leaves a lot of question up in the air. It introduces a whole bunch of concepts
that I’d hoped to explore—but that’ll be another ‘day.’ So far as concluding this project, I might
say that I stumbled upon the question of authority when I was more than halfway through it, and
that’s the question I want to chase now; and that my intention, stepping into this project, had
been to look at Arendt in relation to some of Martin Heidegger’s writing on belonging. I’d also
intended to make my way from Rancière to a whole assortment of his contemporaries who think
about both Arendt and Heidegger. Obviously this wasn’t the time for that.
The trouble with a project like this, approaching human rights as a theoretical concern, is
that it risks becoming alienated from practical concerns. It risks losing sight of the worldly
events that demand response and make the theoretical underpinnings of human rights so deeply
important.
Arendt threads this needle better than almost anyone, combining her concern with
understanding the significance of what has since been acknowledged as the beginning of the
modern refugee crisis—a crisis that was still only just unfolding when she wrote about it, and in
which she, a refugee herself, was personally involved—with her philosophical concern regarding
the existence of the human being. Her engagement with the problem of human rights responds to
the practical political problem faced by refugees in a paradigm of nation-states, and also to the
philosophical question of what the human being is? or as she would put it, what the human
condition is?
To a lesser extent Rancière’s engagement with human rights succeeds in establishing the
same tense equilibrium between the practical and the philosophic (this relationship is the subject
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of his book La Mésentente). Writing almost fifty years after Arendt published Origins, he is
responding to the last decades of the twentieth century, primarily the 90’s, in which human rights
appeared to justify increasingly violent displays of power on the part states which intervened in
humanitarian crises. By the end of the century that established international human rights laws,
the most potent form of human rights appeared to have become the right of superpowers to
humanitarian intervention in weaker states. The question is not whether or not humanitarian
intervention is sometimes necessary or justified, but of the significance of justifying the exercise
of state power on the basis of human rights, whether human rights should apply to sovereign
states. This seems to be a corruption of the basic principles of rights, and Rancière takes it as
such. But he also deals with the question of the human being, entwining it with politics even
more deeply than Aristotle, and giving an account of the political significance, not just of the
capacity for speech, but of the capacity of writing and the production of words.
As for me…less of an observer of political events than either of these two thinkers…
engaging with human rights primarily as a textual concern…attempting to deal with the cleavage
between two theoretical accounts of it without much grounding in the exterior, which is to say
reality, of human rights…it seems to me I must respond, for it is indeed asked, to the question:
do I diminish human rights by thinking of them outside of any immediate political context?
Certainly the political context is there to be thought about, but, at least in this project, I haven’t
done so. It seems to me the only answer I can give is an affirmative one, that yes I’ve separated
human rights from their political contexts, and yes this does diminish them.
In a way, Arendt and Rancière are bristling at precisely such a diminishment of human
rights in their respective times—that is, accounts of human rights that, unintentionally or not,
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prioritize a number of theoretical assumptions, becoming insulated from the practical political
concerns, the worldly realities, of human rights. Rancière’s leitmotif, to politicize human rights,
is an argument against the hermetic theorization which endangers human rights, and to which
they seem prone. Arendt’s critique of the Rights of Man is a critique of a paradigm of human
rights thinking that was mesmerized by the thought of absolutes and failed to give a practical
account of human rights.
Perhaps the answer I’ve given to the question I posed myself is a bit convenient—already
its begun to feel insincere to me. It might be that I’ve answered the question without facing the
problem, or something along those lines. I certainly haven’t constructed a theory of human
rights. I’m contending with two ‘conflicting’ accounts, two theories human rights that pay special
attention to the pitfalls of theorizing human rights. I’m mining texts to produce another text, but
I’m also trying to ‘correct’ certain theories of human rights that get to far from the practical
concerns. I may be very far myself, but the people I’m writing about aren’t.
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